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INTERSECTIONAL COHORTS, DIS/ABILITY,
AND CLASS ACTIONS
Ann C. McGinley* & Frank Rudy Cooper**
ABSTRACT

This Article occupies the junction of dis/abilities studies and critical
race theory. It joins the growing commentary analyzing the
groundbreaking lawsuit by Compton, California students and
teachers against the Compton school district brought under federal
disability law and seeking class certification and injunctive relief in
the form of teacher training, provision of counselors, and changed
disciplinary practices.
The federal district court denied the
defendants’ motion to dismiss but also denied the plaintiffs’ motion
for a preliminary injunction and class certification, resulting in
prolonged settlement talks. The suit is controversial because it seeks
to address the trauma suffered by Black and Latinx students in poor,
violence-torn inner-city communities by characterizing the students as
having disabilities.
The Article disagrees with legal scholarship thus far, which posits
that using disability law to help these students both stigmatizes them
and ignores current disability law’s focus on individual claims.
Instead, this Article asserts that concerns about stigma are
outweighed by the potential to assist distressed students. Doctrinally,
it contends the concern for individual claims is overstated because
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one major goal of disability law is to remove social barriers that
inhibit the flourishing of people with dis/abilities. By analyzing the
social construction model of dis/abilities implicit within current law,
this Article shows that group-based claims like those of the Compton
students are a valid use of the class certification power.
This Article’s key contribution to the dis/abilities studies and
critical race literatures is the creation of a theory of “intersectional
cohorts.” Members of intersectional cohorts share similar selfidentities, attributed identities, and identity performances to the
extent that it is appropriate to think of them as a discrete and
cohesive group in relation to a particular issue. This is a way to
explore the meso-level of discrete and cohesive social groups who
share multiple identities without devolving into a micro-level theory
of each individual or essentializing identities through a macro-level
theory of broad social groups.
Understanding poor Black and Latinx students in violence-torn
neighborhoods as an intersectional cohort presumes that they have
shared experiences and responses to their environment sufficient to
constitute a class that should be certified in the Compton suit and in
other similar lawsuits. This approach is supported by the scientific
research on Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) and their
relationship to complex trauma and disability. We hope this analysis
will serve as a model for future theoretical and applied analysis of
intersectional cohorts, especially with respect to dis/abilities.
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II. The Scholarly Debate ........................................................................309
A. Current Debate .......................................................................310
B. Why Use Dis/ability? ..............................................................314
i. Stigma ..................................................................................315
ii. Doctrinal Disability Law or a Dis/ability
Framework? .....................................................................317
III. Social Construction Theory and Dis/abilities ................................321
IV. Why the Compton Students Should Get Class Status as
“Persons with Disabilities” ..............................................................326
A. Intersectionality Theory and Cohorts...................................326
B. Why the Concept of Intersectional Cohorts Requires a
Remedy in Compton.............................................................334
Conclusion ................................................................................................340

2020]

INTERSECTIONAL COHORTS, DIS/ABILITY, AND CLASS ACTIONS

295

INTRODUCTION
Being a poor Black1 student in a violence-plagued inner-city can be
stressful. Take Chiron, the fictional high school student depicted in
the 2017 Oscar-winning Best Picture, Moonlight.2 Chiron, a poor
Black youth in a drug-ridden community, is emotionally sensitive as a
young child. After becoming a teenager, he is violently bullied in a
school environment that seems indifferent to his experience. Chiron
responds to this violence by becoming “hard” himself, ultimately
transforming into a drug-dealing adult.
Chiron’s story is an
illustration of the trauma faced by poor Black male students in
violence-plagued inner-cities.
Because of their intersecting identities and social location,3 a
significant percentage of the larger cohort of Black and Latinx4
students of all genders in impoverished and violence-plagued innercity communities5 suffers complex trauma because of exposure to
poverty, violence, and racism. This exposure creates the need for a
different learning environment: curricula, teacher training, and
disciplinary methods that recognize the trauma students have faced.
Disability laws as currently written aim to remove barriers that
prevent persons with dis/abilities6 from fulfilling their potential.7 This

1. We capitalize Black and White to emphasize that race is socially constructed.

See infra Part III.
2. See MOONLIGHT (A24 Films 2016). We note concerns about using a

Hollywood depiction of hardscrabble inner-city life to develop arguments about the
real thing. The movie is merely an illustration that helps our narrative, not evidence.
3. By “social location,” we refer to a place with particular social meaning. In our
culture, “urban,” “rural,” and “suburban” are used to imply certain types of
communities. By “social position” we mean the positionality of a person within the
matrix of identities. The trauma we are discussing calls for analysis of both social
location and social position because it is the result of an intersection of the students’
identities (poor, Black and Latinx, young) that is exacerbated by their geographic
location (urbaphobia — non-urbanites fear of the inner-city — reflected in aversion
to entering the “hood,” over-policing, disinvestment, etc.). Using intersectionality
theory, we argue the law fails these youth because it does not recognize that their
intersectional identities affect their trauma in ways that are shared by the group. See
infra Part IV (creating theory of intersectional cohorts).
4. We recognize that other racial minority students, such as South Asians, are, in
some cases, challenged by violence-plagued, inner-city environments. Students of
color (and even Whites) in these social locations could likely be considered part of
the same intersectional cohort, though their appearance in skin tone, dress, and so on
might exempt them from some negative treatment to such an extent as to remove
them from the cohort.
5. In this Article, we discuss only the cohort of students whose communities fit
this description.
6. We are part of a small group of scholars seeking to introduce the term
“dis/ability” to the legal scholarship. See Steven L. Nelson, Special Education,
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Article argues for achieving that purpose by acknowledging that
Black and Latinx students living in poverty constitute discrete and
cohesive intersectional cohorts8 deserving of class certification and
broad remedies under current disability law.
Overrepresentation, and End-Running Education Federalism: Theorizing Towards A
Federally Protected Right to Education for Black Students, 20 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L.
205, 214–15 (2019) (using term); cf. Francisco Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation in
Queer Legal Theory: Majoritarianism, Multidisciplinary, and Responsibility in Social
Justice Scholarship or Legal Scholars as Cultural Warriors, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1409,

1424 (1998) (contending antisubordination’s intersectionality/multidimensionality
approach best suited to address “social injustice against sexual minorities based on
race/ethnicity, class, dis/ability, sex/gender and other axes of social or legal status”).
We use the slash when referring to the actual state of being socially constructed as
dis/abled but omit the slash when referring to current understandings of disability
under the law. We are influenced to shift our way of referring to dis/ability by a book
that, like this Article, merges Critical Race Theory and Dis/ability Studies. The text
that launched the recent movement toward using this term is DISCRIT: DISABILITY
STUDIES AND CRITICAL RACE THEORY IN EDUCATION (David. J. Connor et al. eds.,
2016) (collecting chapters synthesizing Critical Race Theory and Dis/abilities Studies
scholarship in the education context). Editors for the DisCrit anthology describe two
reasons for using this term:
We utilize the term dis/ability to 1: counter the emphasis on having a whole
person represented by what he or she cannot do, rather than what he or she
can, and 2: disrupt notions of the fixity and permanency of the concept of
disability, seeking rather to analyze the entire context in which a person
functions.
Id. at 1. We agree that this shift in language can help deemphasize the implication
that persons with dis/abilities are lacking. The editors later expand upon their
reasoning, stating:
The latter [“disability”] overwhelmingly signals a specific inability to
perform culturally defined expected tasks (such as learning or walking) that
come to define the individual as primarily and generally unable to navigate
society. We believe the slash in the word dis/ability disrupts misleading
understandings of disability, as it simultaneously conveys the social
construction of both ability and disability.
Id. at 6–7. As do those editors, we retain the word “disability” when “referring to its
official or traditional use.” Id. at 7. As we discuss infra Part III, the acknowledgment
that dis/ability is socially constructed is crucial to helping realize the full potential of
disability statutes.
7. See infra notes 146–54 and accompanying text (discussing goals of disability
law).
8. See infra Part IV.A (defining and explicating the term “intersectional
cohorts”). In the term “intersectional cohort,” we use the word “cohort” as it is
commonly defined: “A group of people with a shared characteristic.” Cohort,
LEXICO.COM, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/cohort [https://perma.cc/67AJHQG4] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019). When calling an intersectional cohort “discrete,”
we are referring to the fact that it contains a coherent set of individuals that is
different from many other social groups. When calling an intersectional cohort
“cohesive,” we are referring to the fact that it contains a set of individuals that share
similar identity characteristics, experiences, and responses to societal treatment. Put
another way, by “discrete,” we mean distinct from other potential groups — for
example, Black women domestic servants during Jim Crow could be analyzed
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A lawsuit brought by students from Compton, California, P.P. v.
Compton Unified School District (the Compton case),9 shows how a
claim based significantly upon racial discrimination might be
recharacterized as a disability claim under current law.10 Compton,
famously the home of the “gangsta” rap group N.W.A.,11 is now a
mostly working-class and poor town with high crime rates12 and a
population that is about 57% Latinx, 40% Black, 1% Asian, and 1%
White.13 The Compton plaintiffs assert they have suffered numerous
Adverse Childhood Events (ACEs),14 leading to complex trauma15

separately from Black men of that period — and by “cohesive” we mean that they
have a shared identity to some extent in the similarity of how they see themselves, are
seen, and/or respond to their environment. We leave elaboration of the relation of
“intersectional cohorts” to specific social science understandings of “cohort” for a
future publication.
9. P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1144 (C.D. Cal.
2015) (denying plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction); P.P. v. Compton
Unified Sch. Dist., 2015 WL 5752770, at *1 (Sept. 29, 2015) (denying without
prejudice plaintiffs’ motion for class certification). A case similar to the Compton
case was filed by Native American students with disabilities against the Bureau of
Indian Education. See Stephen C. by Frank C. v. Bureau of Indian Educ., 2018 WL
1871457 at *8 (D. Ariz. Mar. 29, 2018) (refusing to dismiss allegations that the
department’s refusal to create systems that deal with students’ exposure to adversity
and complex trauma so as to facilitate meaningful access to educational
opportunities); Christie Renick, Bureau of Indian Education Failed to Educate Tribal
Youth, Lawsuit Alleges, CHRONICLE SOC. CHANGE (Jan. 12, 2017),
https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/featured/suit-alleges-feds-failed-in-education-oftribal-youth/23939 [https://perma.cc/GPU6-QK3N]. As that case deals with a
different intersectional cohort, we leave discussion of Stephen C. for another time.
10. On the Compton case, see generally infra Part I.
11. N.W.A., STRAIGHT OUTTA COMPTON (Ruthless Records 1988).
12. The designation of communities as “high crime,” and therefore susceptible to
a higher rate of police stop and frisk, is problematic. See Frank Rudy Cooper, A
Genealogy of Programmatic Stop and Frisk: The Discourse to Practice Circuit, 73
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 31, 56 (2018) (criticizing “high crime area” doctrine). Even the
notion that “crime” is defined in particular ways that generally exclude white-collar
(and White-perpetrated) harms is problematic.
13. See NANCY E. DOWD, REIMAGINING EQUALITY: A NEW DEAL FOR CHILDREN
OF COLOR 97 (2018) (utilizing 2016 data).
14. ACEs are Adverse Childhood Events. They include “things like physical and
emotional abuse, neglect, caregiver mental illness, and household violence.” ACEs
and Toxic Stress: Frequently Asked Questions, CTR. ON DEVELOPING CHILD, HARV.
UNIV.,
https://developingchild.harvard.edu/resources/aces-and-toxic-stressfrequently-asked-questions/ [https://perma.cc/Y5MS-EM4A] (last visited Jan. 13,
2020). Suffering more ACEs correlates with suffering more “things like heart disease
and diabetes, poor academic achievement, and substance abuse later in life.” Id.
15. Complex trauma includes:
[S]tressors that are: (1) repetitive, prolonged, or cumulative (2) most often
interpersonal, involving direct harm, exploitation, and maltreatment
including neglect, abandonment, or antipathy by primary caregivers or other
ostensibly responsible adults, and (3) often occur at developmentally
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and educational disability under current law.16
According to
developmental research, ACEs include “specific traumas identified as
having particularly negative long-term effects,”17 including abuse,
neglect, and household dysfunction. The plaintiffs allege that their
schools failed to fulfill their duties under the federal disability laws.
They seek teacher training for working with trauma victims,
counselors educated in helping student victims, curricular reform, and
changes from traditional discipline to restorative justice techniques.18
The Compton plaintiffs moved the court to certify a class action
against the Compton Unified School District (CUSD) and grant them
a temporary injunction requiring the requested district-wide changes.
CUSD responded that applicable disability laws should lead only to
individualized determinations of disability and narrow remedies
limited to those individuals.19 Although the court determined that
vulnerable times in the victim’s life, especially in early childhood
or adolescence, but can also occur later in life and in conditions of
vulnerability associated with disability, disempowerment, dependency, age,
infirmity, and others.
Lisa Firestone, Recognizing Complex Trauma, PSYCHOL. TODAY (July 31, 2012),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/compassion-matters/201207/recognizingcomplex-trauma [https://perma.cc/4TZJ-VLGQ] (citing Christine Courtois,
Understanding Complex Trauma, Complex Reactions, and Treatment Approaches,
GIFT FROM WITHIN, https://www.giftfromwithin.org/pdf/Understanding-CPTSD.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GAD2-E42K] (last visited Jan. 27, 2020)).
16. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 13, 14–21, 23–27, 28–31, 35–37, P.P.
v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp.3d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 15-3726)
(claiming ACEs lead to complex trauma and schools’ failure to accommodate);
DOWD, supra note 13, at 97–114 (considering ACEs research and the Compton case).
17. See DOWD, supra, note 13, at 100–01.
18. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 6–8 (alleging that
there is a national scientific consensus on how to educate children with complex
trauma, which includes training teachers about complex trauma, engaging in wholeschool remedies, and using restorative justice techniques rather than traditional
discipline; and that the CUSD had failed to adopt any of these practices despite
awareness of the trauma suffered by its students).
19. It is true that in general, current disability laws focus on individual rights and
remedies. But the concern that persons with dis/abilities be treated as individuals
exists to protect persons with dis/abilities and does not preclude class actions and
group remedies. When a plaintiff brings an individual action under the current
disability laws, he or she must prove membership in the protected class (for example,
that the plaintiff is a person with a disability). This is done by an individualized
determination. See, e.g., Kemp v. Holder, 610 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that
the plaintiff was not an individual with a disability under the original statute and that
the ADAAA, the amendments to the original ADA, should not be applied
retroactively). The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400–85 (2004), another example, requires that schools create individual education
plans (IEPs) for children with disabilities. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414. IEPs are plans
created by a team of faculty members and parents that establish the academic
progress and goals for the individual student and the means for achieving those
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the plaintiffs satisfied the “commonality” requirement of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), it denied the class certification motion
without prejudice because, it concluded, the plaintiffs had not
demonstrated “numerosity,” as they had not proved that the roughly
25% of the student population that was exposed to complex trauma

educational goals. For an excellent explanation of the IEP process, see generally
KYRIE E. DRAGOO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41833, THE INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA), PART B: KEY STATUTORY AND
REGULATORY
PROVISIONS
(2017),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41833.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KTM3-MGTQ]. In addition to the individual processes and
remedies provided by the current disability laws, however, the federal disability laws
also permit class actions so long as the named plaintiffs fulfill the class action
requirements. See, e.g., Lacy v. Cook Cty. Ill., 897 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding
that lower court had properly certified a class action in Title II ADA case).
Moreover, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (as well as the ADA) permits class
actions alleging discriminatory effect — disparate impact causes of actions — that do
not require a showing of intentional discrimination. See Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287 (1985) (holding that even though not all disparate effects are prohibited by
the statute, many are). Finally, class actions alleging that the defendant has engaged
in a discriminatory pattern or practice against persons with disabilities are viable.
When bringing those class actions in the initial litigation stages, the plaintiffs do not
have to prove that each individual in the class is a victim of the challenged policy or
practice. In fact, in a number of cases, the courts have held that the plaintiffs do not
need to establish that each member of the class has been harmed by the defendant’s
policies or practices during the liability phase of the case. See United States v.
Denver, 943 F. Supp. 1304 (D. Colo. 1996) (ADA case alleging pattern and practice);
see also Int’l. Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336–42, 360–62 (1977)
(holding that the plaintiffs did not have to demonstrate that each member of the class
had suffered illegal discrimination during the liability phase of a Title VII case;
instead, the plaintiffs had to prove a pattern and practice of discrimination to prove
liability, and in the remedial stage it is defendant’s burden to prove that individual
class members did not suffer illegal discrimination). The ADA regulations require
the state to modify policies and practices that harm individuals and classes of
individuals with disabilities. Moreover, the regulations prohibit state institutions from
applying eligibility criteria that screen out persons with disabilities. For example, the
regulations for Title II of the ADA state:
(7)(i) A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid
discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can
demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the
nature of the service, program or activity.
(8) A public entity shall not impose or apply eligibility criteria that screen
out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of
individuals with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any service,
program, or activity, unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for
the provision of the service, program, or activity being offered.
28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (7)(i), (8) (2016) (emphasis added). These regulations anticipate
changes to policies, practices, procedures, and eligibility criteria when individuals or
classes of individuals are harmed by them on the basis of disability.
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had actually developed disabilities.20 Even though the federal district
court denied the motion to certify a class, it also denied a motion to
dismiss the claims, concluding that the allegations stated a claim for
relief under the substantive law.21 The district court’s denial of the
preliminary injunction, absent class certification, appears to be largely
due to the court’s discomfort with creating a class remedy without
individualized determination of the students’ disabilities.22 This,
effectively, is a causation argument — whether the trauma from living
in a poor and violence-torn community caused each of the putative
class members to suffer a disability (under the law as currently
interpreted). The court’s decision presumably resists the conclusion
that a large percentage of the cohort created by the shared
experiences of being a Black and Latinx youth in a “high crime,”23
inner-city24 neighborhood is likely to suffer complex trauma and
emotional, mental, or physical disabilities. The court’s decision is
arguably consistent with the disability law’s focus on individual
remedies.25 In essence, though, its holding would require not only a
showing that a large percentage of the school population suffered
complex trauma but also the very difficult showing of evidence on an
individual basis that Black and Latinx students’ exposure to complex
trauma had resulted in definable disabilities. The Article argues that
courts, when faced with motions to certify class actions in cases
similar to Compton, should grant the motion to certify the class if the
plaintiffs provide evidence of expert testimony that the plaintiffs as a

20. See P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 2015 WL 5752770, at *5–10; *18–19
(Sept. 29, 2015) (questioning whether the plaintiffs had yet established numerosity
and typicality necessary for class certification). For a more expansive explanation of
the federal rules concerning class action certification, see infra note 195.
21. See P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1144 (C.D. Cal.
2015) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss).
22. See Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 2015 WL 5752770, at *5–10; *18–19
(questioning whether the plaintiffs had yet established numerosity and typicality
necessary for class certification).
23. One could try to use a more neutral term by referring to neighborhoods as
having high crime rates, but as we suggest supra at note 12, that would not be a
neutral designation either. We thus call these “high crime” neighborhoods with
quotation marks to indicate that that is how they are often referred to, not an
agreement with the characterization.
24. Unfortunately, the “inner-city” racial minority neighborhoods we are
referring to are often impoverished. See, e.g., Quick Facts: Compton City, U.S.
CENSUS,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/comptoncitycalifornia
[https://perma.cc/KR3M-8ZKY] (last visited Jan. 16, 2020) (stating that 23% of
Compton residents are poor). Hence, we will imply poverty in future references to
inner-city communities.
25. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 16 (identifying individual focus).
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group suffered ACEs that lead to complex trauma and learning and
emotional disabilities. At the liability phase of the case, evidence that
the class representatives have suffered ACEs, complex trauma, and
disabilities combined with expert evidence demonstrating causation is
sufficient to prove the plaintiffs’ case. Thus, at the remedial phase of
the case, courts should grant broad-based class remedies requested by
the plaintiffs such as modifications of school policies and practices to
assure adequate education of children even in the absence of each
putative class member’s showing that they suffered individual harm.
At this stage of the case, the defendant may respond by proving that
individual members of the class have not suffered disabilities as a
result of ACEs and complex trauma, proof that would require the
court to deny individual remedies as to those individuals.
This Article considers whether the concept of dis/ability — as it
intersects with race, class, gender, age, and geography — can and
should be used to do more to help us understand and promote the
well-being of kids like Chiron and the plaintiffs in the Compton
case. It argues that when there is ample expert evidence that
exposure to complex trauma causes learning, emotional, and physical
dis/abilities, the plaintiffs should not have to make individual
showings of dis/ability of the putative class members. At least at the
liability stage, a showing that a significant percentage of the
population has suffered multiple ACEs and complex trauma should
satisfy the law’s numerosity requirement because the racism, poverty,
and violence that children in this environment so often face is
significantly likely to lead to ACEs, complex trauma, and dis/ability.
Because the Compton plaintiffs are a discrete and cohesive
intersectional cohort, they should be presumed to suffer similar fates
from their ACEs — a cognizable disability under current law — at
least for the purposes of certifying a class when the individual
plaintiffs allege they have suffered serious disabilities.26
Ultimately, this Article reframes the debate about the interactions
between race and dis/ability in schools by proposing an innovation in
critical race theory’s intersectionality theory.27 The highly regarded
26. See infra note 8 (defining “discrete” and “cohesive vis a vis intersectional
cohorts); infra notes 33–34 and accompanying text (summarizing basis for
intersectional cohort concept); infra Part IV.A (defining intersectional cohorts).
27. On intersectionality, see generally infra Part IV.A. To understand how we
alter intersectionality theory, one first needs to consider how anti-essentialism relates
to intersectionality. Key critical race theorists Devon Carbado and Cheryl Harris say
the following:
Although [intersectionality’s founder, Kimberlé] Crenshaw does not employ
the language of essentialism, one can read her intervention as an effort to
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legal scholar who first analyzed intersectional identities and coined
the term “intersectionality,” Kimberlé Crenshaw, has described the
theory’s mission as including the investigation of
“how the
experiences of women of color are frequently the product of
intersecting patterns of racism and sexism.”28 Likewise, preeminent
sociologist of race and gender Patricia Hill Collins defines
intersectionality as “the critical insight that race, class, gender,
sexuality, ethnicity, nation, ability, and age operate not as unitary,
mutually exclusive entities, but as reciprocally constructing
phenomena that in turn shape complex social inequalities.”29 For

de-essentialize white-centered representations of gender; to disrupt the ease
and naturalness with which white women can stand in for all women; and to
mark the discursive, political, and doctrinal consequences of the
representational practice of treating what happens to white women as the
baseline from which to determine what happens to all women — the erasure
of Black women’s identities and experiences as women.
Simultaneously, Crenshaw indicts the way in which antiracist advocacy
treats what happens to Black men as the baseline for defining racism,
obscuring Black women’s experience as Black people.”
Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Intersectionality at 30: Mapping the Margins
of Anti-Essentialism, Intersectionality, and Dominance Theory, 132 HARV. L. REV.
2193, 2201 (2019). On the basis of that thinking from Crenshaw, via Carbado and
Harris, we contend that Crenshaw’s work necessarily assumes some of the antiessentialist insights from the Black feminists of the 1970s and 80s. But those insights
are that essentialism is harmful when one non-representative group stands for the
whole, not that a subgroup of the whole cannot be used as a basis for analysis of the
subgroup’s characteristics and experiences are sufficiently similar. Devon Carbado
points out that neither Crenshaw nor he agrees that Crenshaw’s work is simply
“expanding upon” anti-essentialism. We agree.
28. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1243 (1991).
29. Patricia Hill Collins, Intersectionality’s Definitional Dilemmas, 41 ANN. REV.
SOC. 1, 2 (2015). We note that we do not feel the need to choose between Crenshaw’s
and Collins’s similar, though differently emphasized, approaches to intersectionality.
We take our basic understanding from Crenshaw, whose work we read first, but
utilize more of Collins’s work to distinguish among macro-, micro-, and meso-levels
of analysis. See infra notes 173–85 and accompanying text (distinguishing levels of
analysis). Likewise, law and anthropology scholar Khiara Bridges defines
intersectionality as “refer[ring] to ‘the interaction between gender, race, and other
categories of difference in individual lives, social practices, institutional
arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the outcomes of these interactions in terms
of power.’” KHIARA M. BRIDGES, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: A PRIMER 233 (2019)
(quoting Kathy Davis, Intersectionality as Buzzword: A Sociology of Science
Perspective on What Makes a Feminist Theory Successful, 9 FEMINIST THEORY 67, 68
(2008)). For Bridges, it boils down to a way to “think and talk about the experiences
of multiply subordinated individuals and groups.” Id. at 233. In an article about
violence against women of color, intersectionality theory’s founder described her
project as expanding upon an anti-essentialist approach to identity, but once again,
the anti-essentialism espoused by Crenshaw is the inappropriate essentialism of
assuming that all women have the same experiences as White women and all Blacks
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instance, everyone has a race and a gender, but women of color are
generally subordinated by multiple social inequalities in the form of
both racism and sexism.30 The intersection of being a woman and of
color thus impacts that group of people differently than it does men
of color or women who are White.
This Article makes two key contributions to the literatures on
intersectionality theory and dis/abilities studies.31
First, at a
theoretical level, we coin the term “intersectional cohorts.” This
allows us to extend intersectionality theory by demonstrating that,
implicitly, it has always been concerned with appropriate ways to
define cohorts of identity groups. As German sociologists Gabriele
Winker and Nina Degele have noted, there is a happy medium
between the harmful essentialist analyses of large groups and
requiring that every individual be defined with such specificity that no
patterns can be discerned.32 The desire to avoid over-essentializing is
a reason to distinguish discrete and coherent intersectional cohorts
from large macro-level groups. Appropriate uses of intersectional
cohorts include people sharing similar experiences, environments,
self-identities, attributed identities, and identity performances to such
extent that it is appropriate to think of them as both a discrete and a
cohesive group in relation to a particular issue.33
Second, doctrinally, we argue that considering the Compton
students to be a discrete and cohesive intersectional cohort allows a
group-based analysis of dis/abilities that helps explain why the
have the same experiences as Black men. See Crenshaw, supra note 28, at 1242
(“Although racism and sexism readily intersect in the lives of real people, they
seldom do in feminist and antiracist practices. And so, when the practices expound
identity as woman or person of color as an either/or proposition, they relegate the
identity of women of color to a location that resists telling.”).
30. See, e.g., BRIDGES, supra note 29, at 249 (noting “there may be a danger that
attaches to the claim that privileged individuals have identities that are as
intersectional as those possessed by subordinated individuals”).
31. Cf. Kimani Paul-Emile, Blackness as Disability, 106 GEO. L. J. 293 (2018)
(arguing disability law frameworks might work better than race law in addressing
racial discrimination because it does not always require a showing of intent); But cf.
Claire Raj, Disability Law as an Agent of School Reform, 94 WASH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript on file with the authors) (contending disability law
cannot be used for pervasive school reform for racial minority children); DOWD,
supra note 13, at 97–114 (creating developmental equality theory, applying it to
Compton litigation).
32. See Gabriele Winker & Nina Degele, Intersectionality and Multi-Level
Analysis: Dealing with Social Inequality, 18 EUR. J. WOMEN’S STUD. 51, 53 (2011)
(calling for analysis of patterns within and across groups).
33. See supra note 8 (defining “discrete” and “cohesive” intersectional cohorts);
see infra notes 167–70 and accompanying text (defining and distinguishing selfidentity, attributed identities, and identity performances).
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plaintiffs deserve class certification and a broad remedy.34 As
distinguished
Professor
Crenshaw,
who
first
articulated
intersectionality theory, implicitly acknowledged when arguing for
recognizing Black women’s intersectional employment discrimination
claims, law sometimes requires generalizing, but not too much, in
order to recognize harms.35 Recognizing poor, Black or Latinx
students in violence-torn urban environments as a class in cases like
Compton is appropriate because of their shared self-identities and
identity performances in response to their common attributed
identities, especially given that their claim is backed by the science of
ACEs.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I uses Moonlight to frame a
discussion of the allegations in the Compton case and other similar
lawsuits. Part II evaluates the scholarly debate as to whether the
current disability laws can and should be used to redress harms to
racial minorities that are caused by environmental factors. Part III
analyzes the social construction of race and dis/ability in order to
demonstrate that disability law must address barriers that affect
groups as well as those affecting individuals. Part IV defines and
explains our new “intersectional cohorts” approach. It contends that
where a substantial percentage of children in a given school district
have suffered numerous ACEs, complex trauma, and dis/abilities,
there is sufficient evidence to certify a class, to hold the school district
liable, and to require broad-based remedies. The Article then briefly
concludes.36

34. Intersectionality theory is fundamentally about the ways that social power
exercised by categorization differentially impact different social groups. For instance,
the social construction of the categories of race, gender, class and so on, leads to
oppression by means of racism, sexism, and classism, but also to oppression specific
to social locations created by the intersection of the categories. Thinking, where
appropriate, of social groups in terms of intersectional cohorts allows new forms of
cross-group analysis. Here, that means looking at poor Black and Latinx students of
all genders who are located in impoverished and violence-plagued neighborhoods as
a cohort that is discrete and cohesive enough to justify class action, even while
recognizing that some individuals will need different accommodations.
35. Crenshaw, supra note 28, at 1244–45.
36. Although we argue that the court in Compton erred in denying the class
certification, the desired result might be accomplished by bringing a suit with many
named plaintiffs without asking for class certification. Given the large number of
plaintiffs, it would be appropriate to initiate a broad-based remedy or even further
screening of school children within the same intersectional cohort as the plaintiffs.
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I. MOONLIGHT AND THE COMPTON CASE
This Part uses Moonlight to show the stress that young Black male
students in violence-prone inner-cities suffer and thereby introduce
the claims of the Compton plaintiffs. To illustrate this stress, we refer
to the scene in Moonlight where Chiron is beaten at the direction of
the school bully and responds in an explosive manner. We want to
pause to laud the film for its portrayal of Chiron, who is hardly a
caricature of an angry Black man. He is sensitive even as he grows up
in a harsh world where his drug-addicted mother hates him because
he is gay and a drug dealer and his girlfriend are his mentors. One of
the key scenes in the movie is Chiron’s response to the beating.37
The scene opens with Chiron’s head buried in a sink of ice. He lifts
his head to look at his blood-smeared face. At first, he seems to be
merely observing what he sees in the mirror; then, his countenance
turns grim. The next scene shows Chiron from behind striding
purposefully into the school. The kids who see him initially seem to
be responding to something in his face. He bursts through two doors.
He hesitates momentarily, and his facial expression suggests he is
thinking about something. Then his mien becomes grim again, and he
bursts through two more doors and into the classroom. He puts down
his bag, grabs a chair, and slams it over the bully’s head. He looks at
the motionless bully and strikes him with a leg of the chair before
being dragged away by classmates. When next we see Chiron, he is a
muscle-bound drug dealer called “Black” who is years older and
soaks his face in ice water to begin his mornings.
If Moonlight is telling us something about what it means to be a
poor young Black male student suffering from complex trauma, what
is it? Chiron points toward the trauma generally experienced by
Black and Latinx youth of all genders in inner-cities. Physically, they
are more likely to suffer a battery or sexual assault.38 They are also
more likely to suffer vicarious trauma through witnessing violence
against friends and family.39 Environmentally, they are more likely to
live in ethnically or racially isolated communities, raising the
likelihood of suffering from racial bias in policing, employment,

37. See Moonlight – Chiron Loses It (‘Becoming Black’), YOUTUBE (June 28,
2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fVAbPyJyraQ [https://perma.cc/4LP6SY6H] (depicting Chiron’s transition to “Black”).
38. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶ 16 (asserting that Plaintiff
had suffered and witnessed many incidents of serious violence).
39. See id. at ¶¶ 16, 28–30 (asserting that the plaintiffs have suffered and
witnessed extreme violence).
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housing, and other traumas.40 Such neighborhoods also are often
financially impoverished. Combined, racism and poverty raise the
risk that children will suffer from problems like food insecurity and
toxic hazards.41 Kids like Chiron, living in communities segregated by
race, also feel the psychic pain of living in poverty in a nation of vast
wealth.42 Then they are shunted into ethnically or racially segregated
schools that are underfunded, overpoliced, and stereotyped as not
producing smart and productive civilians. We thus posit, based on the
evidence produced in Compton and our analysis below, that this
particular intersection of race, gender, place, and poverty is
disproportionately a site that produces complex trauma and
emotional, mental, and physical disabilities. To understand why, we
need to consider how the Compton case has played out against the
backdrop of federal disability law.
In May 2015, plaintiffs — students and teachers — filed a class
action suit against CUSD, the Superintendent, and members of the
Compton school board, alleging the defendants had violated Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Department of Education
regulations promulgated under Section 504, and Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act.43 The First Amended Complaint
details the backgrounds of children living in Compton. They suffer
from poverty, racism, incarceration, violence, homophobia, and the
threat of deportations.44 The complaint further alleges that students
in poor communities experience complex trauma, which is often
compounded by minority status and racism.45 Specifically, a number
of the student-plaintiffs allege that they have suffered from severe
ACEs, including witnessing the violent death of friends or family
40. See generally Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering:
Navigating the Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1999,

2002 (2007) (community economic development implicates environmental justice)
(citing
Rachel
D.
Godsil
&
James
S.
Freeman, Jobs, Trees, and Autonomy: The Convergence of the Environmental
Justice Movement and Community Economic Development, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 25, 47 (1994)).
41. See, e.g., William M. Wiecek, Structural Racism and the Law in America
Today: An Introduction, 100 KY. L.J. 1, 16 (2012) (contending “[s]egregation
concentrates poverty, and concentrated poverty leads to poor health outcomes
cradle-to-grave”).
42. See, e.g., Robert Doughten, Filling Everyone’s Bowl: A Call to Affirm A

Positive Right to Minimum Welfare Guarantees and Shelter in State Constitutions to
Satisfy International Standards of Human Decency, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 421, 422 (2004)
(decrying wealth inequality).
43. First Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 6–8.
44. Id. at ¶ 12.
45. Id.
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members, seeing a father hold a gun to a mother’s head, sexual
assault, losing a parent or close family member to disease or violence,
and separation from siblings when placed in foster care, among other
trauma-inducing situations.46
According to the Complaint, research demonstrates that although
children vary in their reactions, those who suffer two or more ACEs
are prone to complex trauma, resulting in symptoms that often fit the
definition of disability under the federal disability statutes — such as
an impairment that substantially limits brain function, and the ability
to learn, think, and concentrate, among other major life activities.47
Professor Dowd’s book details the research that supports the
Complaint’s allegations.48 For instance, ACEs can cause changes in
the neurological system, hyper-sensitivities, and complex trauma.49
Accepted research-based methods exist to improve the conditions
and education of children who suffer complex trauma.50 These
methods include schools’ affirmative actions to improve the children’s
ability to learn and to grant these children meaningful access to
education through both whole-school approaches and individualized
educational plans (IEPs).51
The Complaint further alleges that a failure to adopt these
measures harms children and denies them meaningful access to
education and that CUSD has not only failed to adopt whole-school
measures to ameliorate the children’s trauma but has also used
disciplinary measures that increased harm to children with complex
trauma, denying them meaningful access to an education.52 Under
federal law, all qualified children with disabilities have a right to
“meaningful access” to educational opportunities and benefits.53 The
Complaint details very specific allegations about a number of student
plaintiffs, the ACEs and complex trauma they have experienced, and
CUSD’s failure to adopt or modify its measures to accommodate the
students.54 It also alleges that plaintiffs-teachers who witnessed the
children’s reactions to trauma themselves suffered as a result of
46. Id. at ¶¶ 14–16, 23, 28–29, 33.
47. Id. at ¶¶ 1–3.
48. See DOWD, supra note 13, at 100–14.
49. Id. at 102–06.
50. First Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 1–7.
51. Id. at ¶¶ 5–7; see supra note 19 (explaining IEPs).
52. First Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 6–7.
53. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985) (stating that qualified
persons with disabilities have the right to “meaningful access to the benefit” offered
by the grantee).
54. First Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 14–55.
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CUSD’s failure to train teachers and to take other measures to
ameliorate the children’s trauma.55 The Complaint sought injunctive
relief that would require CUSD to engage in teacher training,
restorative justice techniques, and other measures to assure its
students have meaningful access to education.56
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss all counts of the
Complaint, which the federal district court denied in a detailed
opinion.57 Rejecting the defendants’ arguments, the court concluded
that the plaintiffs’ complaint set forth a viable cause of action under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,58 Section 504 of the
Department of Education Regulations,59 and Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).60 While the court did not
conclude that any particular plaintiff had suffered complex trauma
and a resulting disability — an issue of fact that would be decided
after discovery — the detailed allegations in the complaint were
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).61
While the court agreed that the Complaint stated a valid cause of
action, it did not accept the premise that mere exposure to two or
more ACEs would automatically cause an individual to suffer
complex trauma or disability under the statutes involved. In essence,
the court would require a showing that each of the individual
plaintiffs who were exposed to ACEs had suffered from complex
trauma and consequently fulfill the legal definition of a disability.62

55. Id. at ¶¶ 45–47.
56. The definition of “restorative” techniques that the plaintiffs seek is unclear.
For an analysis of the different possible meanings of restorative justice, see Lydia
Nussbaum, Realizing Restorative Justice: Legal Rules and Standards for School
Discipline Reform, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 583, 622–32 (2018). It is necessary to define
exactly what “restorative practices” the school district will use and how it will use
them. Id. at 628. The school district must also be aware of differential discipline of
minority students despite the presence of restorative techniques. See id. at 633–34.
57. See generally P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1130–
33 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (describing procedural posture).
58. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).
59. 34 C.F.R. § 104.32 (1980).
60. P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp.3d 1126, 1134 (C.D. Cal.
2015). See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2012). Title II is
found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–65.
61. In December 2015, after the court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, the
plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint, which, for all practical purposes, was
the same as the original complaint.
62. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp.3d at 1134.
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Following the court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, the parties
have been engaged in settlement negotiations.63 Given the duration
and what appears to be the seriousness of these negotiations, the
Compton case can only improve the educational opportunities (and
therefore, the lives) of poor minority children in the school district so
long as the parties negotiate to create clear disciplinary and
educational standards that would benefit the plaintiffs.64 Those may
include the use of restorative justice techniques, as opposed to
traditional methods of discipline, as well as professional development
on the effects of trauma and how to support students who have been
traumatized.
Restorative justice techniques seek to rebuild
relationships in the community through means like apologies and
restitutionary service rather than punishment.65 In the event the
negotiations break down, the lawsuit will proceed.
Before discussing the case further, we need to address the scholarly
debate on whether we can and should use current disability law to
address issues of racial and class injustice. The next Part describes the
arguments that have arisen over whether disability law can be used as
a vehicle to address racial discrimination and answers the question
why, with reservations, we think that disability law should provide
relief to address disability-related issues related to race and class
discrimination.
II. THE SCHOLARLY DEBATE
The plaintiffs’ claims in Compton on behalf of kids like Chiron
have sparked a lively debate amongst legal scholars over whether
dis/ability can be analogized with race.66 While she does not
specifically study the Compton case, Professor Kimani Paul-Emile
argues that current disability law frameworks might be useful to
further the interests of African Americans.67 Professor Claire Raj
strongly disagrees, on doctrinal grounds, as she believes the Compton
case fails the current interpretation of the individual causation
63. See, e.g., Jeremy Loudenback, Compton Trauma Lawsuit Near Resolution?,
LA SCHOOL REP. (June 9, 2016), http://laschoolreport.com/compton-trauma-lawsuitnear-resolution/ [https://perma.cc/W3MT-WBTB].
64. See Nussbaum, supra note 56, at 622–34, 639–44 (discussing benefits of
restorative justice techniques for students).
65. See generally id. (explaining methods).
66. On the scholarly debate, see generally infra Part II.A.
67. See generally Paul-Emile, supra note 31 (arguing that disability frameworks,
rather than race law may better deal with race discrimination because disability law
requires accommodations to the individual and does not always require a showing of
intent).
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requirement in the disability statutes.68 Moreover, Raj is concerned
about the stigma of suggesting that being a racial minority is a
disability, as that term is currently understood.69 Finally, Professor
Nancy Dowd’s important book, Reimagining Equality: A New Deal
for Children of Color, like Raj’s essay, contends that arguing that
racial minorities have disabilities might lead to stigma.70 Dowd adds
that, in any event, remedying complex trauma in schools would occur
too late to promote developmental equality.71 She thus advocates for
a comprehensive “New Deal for Children” that would provide all
children with the social and psychological environment they need to
reach their potential before they enter school — from parenting
classes to early education and other social services.72 While we
believe that Dowd’s solutions are ideal, we question the likelihood of
Dowd’s proposal and believe current disability law’s potential utility
in helping the Compton plaintiffs outweighs concerns about stigma.
A. Current Debate
There is substantial commentary on whether the Compton
approach makes sense as a means to attack poor conditions in schools
and create equality. Paul-Emile’s award-winning article, Blackness as
Disability,73 advocates the use of current disability law, or at least
disability law frameworks, to further rights of persons of color.
Noting that both race and dis/ability are socially constructed, PaulEmile explains that race law is tethered to a rigid anti-discrimination
framework that ordinarily requires a showing of intentional
discrimination in order to prevail.74 Such an intent requirement is

68. Raj, supra note 31, at 5 (noting that, “[b]y definition, systemic reforms that
change the delivery of education for all children are not tied to an individual
student’s needs, but rather are driven by the group’s collective needs. While the
group may, in fact, require and benefit from these curricular changes, the FAPE
standard — and thus disability rights law — does not compel them”) (footnotes
omitted). “FAPE” stands for Free and Appropriate Public Education, and is an
individual right provided by the disability statutes. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 (1980).
69. See Raj, supra note 31, at 6.
70. DOWD, supra note 13, at 106.
71. Id. at 106, 112.
72. Id. at 126–29 (presenting proposal).
73. See generally Paul-Emile, supra note 31. See Simone Somekh, Professor
Kimani Paul-Emile Wins John Hope Franklin Prize, FORDHAM L. NEWS (June 5,
2019),
https://news.law.fordham.edu/blog/2019/06/05/professor-kimani-paul-emilewins-john-hope-franklin-prize/ [https://perma.cc/SW9K-YZBS] (announcing award
for article).
74. See Paul-Emile, supra note 31, at 296.
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difficult to prove and tends not to promote structural change.75
Moreover, Paul-Emile argues that Black identity, especially when
combined with class, creates disadvantages that can be overcome only
by using affirmative remedies.76
Unfortunately, the remedies
attached to race law infrequently require an affirmative duty to act, a
duty that exists in federal disability civil rights laws.77
Paul-Emile’s theory is innovative and intriguing and seemingly
would support lawsuits against school districts such as CUSD.
Importantly, she understands the social construction model of
dis/ability, which we explicate in the next Part, and argues that
refusing to use current disability law to counter race discrimination
and other racial disadvantages because of a feared stigmatizing of
people of color is a refusal based in stereotype and stigma of persons
with dis/abilities.78 But Paul-Emile’s argument, while thoughtprovoking, does not take adequate account of the reality of how
courts currently interpret disability discrimination law. While she
cites the language of the various disability statutes, she admittedly
does not investigate the doctrine fully. 79
Even though the ADA was originally written as a far-reaching
statute that would change the lives of persons with disabilities, courts
de-radicalized the statute with rigid and narrow interpretations of
who met the definition of a person with a disability. As a result, many
persons who should have protections under the statute were left out
in the cold.80 In response, Congress passed the Americans with
Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), which
explicitly overruled a number of limiting Supreme Court cases and
broadened definitions of who is protected under the statute.81
Unfortunately, however, even under the amended Act, a substantial
minority of courts continue to conclude that individuals who appear
to have valid claims do not meet the current definition of having a
disability.82

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 326.
78. Id. at 299–300.
79. Paul-Emile states that her essay is “more conceptual than doctrinal” and urges
us to use the current disability laws to think about how to approach race. Id. at 302.
80. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Explaining “Not Disabled” Cases Ten Years after
the ADAAA: A Story of Ignorance, Incompetence, and Possibly Animus, 26 GEO. J.
POV. L. & POL’Y 383, 384–89 (2019).
81. Id. at 384, 389–91.
82. See id. at 411–12 (arguing that courts are limiting the Act’s potential).
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Dis/ability law scholar Claire Raj raises practical doctrinal
questions in Disability Law as an Agent of School Reform and
suggests a number of improvements over the Compton case model.83
In a careful explanation of the law — specifically, the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, Department of Education regulations under Section 504, and
Title II of the ADA — Raj details the potential weaknesses of the
legal arguments in the Compton case. While we do not have room
here to fully analyze the doctrine or Raj’s essay, suffice it to say that
Raj’s concerns are warranted. Raj explains that Compton may be
stretching the current disability laws, especially concerning the
remedies demanded by the plaintiffs.84 Generally, she correctly
notes, disability laws focus on individual children rather than groups
of children.85 The underlying goal of the Compton lawsuit, however,
is to engage in overall school reform, without a focus on individuals.86
At the doctrinal level, Raj shows that while the “child-find”
requirement under the IDEA — the “location and notification”
requirement under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act’s
Department of Education regulations — requires schools to assure
they have found children in need of special education, there is some
ambiguity about the measures schools need to take to identify these
children.87
A requirement that schools in impoverished
neighborhoods test all students may or may not be a fair reading of
the law, even though Raj concedes that testing in this situation might
be useful.88 The problem is that even if testing of all students is
required by the law as interpreted, she argues, doing so may impose a
stigma on poor, minority children and communities by linking racial
minority status to a perceived deficit.89
Even assuming there is a duty to test all students in particular
districts, Raj reminds us that the existence of ACEs does not
necessarily lead to complex trauma or disability in all students, and
the remedies requested by the Compton case may go well beyond
what the statutes currently would require.90 The guarantee of a Free
and Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) that students are granted

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Raj, supra note 31, at 50–57.
Id. at 3–6.
Id.
Id. at 4–20.
Id. at 4–5, 17, 30, 31–34.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id. at 32–36.
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under the Department of Education regulations applies to
individuals, not groups, and the statutes require individual, not group,
accommodation.91 Moreover, as Raj notes, even when the plaintiffs
make an argument that pertains to the group under Section 504 and
the ADA, they may not prevail.92 The reason they might not prevail
is that the regulations require schools to make “reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the
modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination based on
disability unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the services,
program, or activity.”93 While plaintiffs might succeed in proving that
such accommodations are necessary to avoid discrimination, the
school district will argue that the remedies requested are class-wide,
require the expenditure of substantial sums, portend reformation of
the entire education program, and therefore “would fundamentally
alter the nature of” the schools’ educational programs.94 Such
arguments are not frivolous and may succeed given the deference
courts often give to schools.95
Professor Dowd joins Raj in questioning the use of the ACEs
model and the federal disability laws to create reform for children of
color for four reasons. First, using current disability law to attempt to
ameliorate childhood harms may reinforce stereotypes already
attached to Black children like “incapability, lack of intellectual
capacity, and dangerousness.”96 Relatedly, the ACEs approach “may
tend toward identifying causes in the individual or the individual’s
family, rather than in structural harm.”97 Moreover, the lawsuit
intervenes in children’s lives only after they go to school and focuses
on improving education rather than preventing the harms due to
structural and environmental causes that occur in early childhood.98
91. Id. at 16.
92. See id. at 38–40.
93. Rothschild v. Grottenthaler, 907 F.2d 286, 293 (2d Cir. 1990); 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.130(b)(7)(i) (1991). While the plain language of the Section 504 regulations does
not include this defense, courts have imposed this limitation on the regulation. See
Raj, supra note 31, at 39.
94. Raj, supra note 31, at 39.
95. See, e.g., C.D. M.D. v. Natick Pub. Sch. Dist., 924 F.3d 621, 630 (1st Cir. 2019)
(holding that “courts owe respect and deference to the expert decisions of school
officials and state administrative boards” in IDEA cases).
96. DOWD, supra note 13, at 106. Dowd is also concerned that there will be a
focus on the child and his or her family without a focus on structural causes of harm.

See id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 106.
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This contradicts the fact that “early childhood is one of the most
critical developmental periods.”99 Finally, the ACEs model was
created to measure adverse family events of middle-class (and Whitenormed) children and does not necessarily effectively measure all
harms caused by structural and environmental causes.100
Dowd’s critiques are particularly incisive, but, we think,
surmountable. Dowd’s proposed “New Deal for Children” would be
ideal, but given the current social reality of the center-right tendency
in U.S. voting, her legislative plan may not come to be for a long
time.101 A switch from an extreme right-wing president to an extreme
left-wing president is possible, but unlikely. Moreover, the far right
has captured the Supreme Court that would have to uphold Dowd’s
bold proposal. It is thus worthwhile to consider whether existing
disability laws provide promise for children injured by the
intersection of race, dis/ability, and the environments in which they
live. In fact, it might be possible to win a lawsuit pursuant to the
“child-find” obligation to require a school district to screen children
early on before they are of school age in order to permit the everimportant early intervention, teaching of young children before they
reach school.102
B. Why Use Dis/ability?
There is no doubt that Raj and Dowd launch significant critiques of
using current disability law to improve the lives of children of color,
but we think it may be worth reconsidering the value in such a move.
We are reluctant to turn to disability law for two reasons. First, the
possibility of stigma is real. Second, the current interpretation of the
disability statutory frameworks renders the efficacy of a Comptontype claim of questionable. While we partially refute those two

99. Id. at 100.
100. Id. at 106–07. Professor Dowd notes that subsequent models have been
created and tested to include more environmental factors, but she concludes that the
model continues to underrepresent the harms caused by racism. Id. at 107–10.
101. On the center-right tendency of U.S. voting, see Michael W.
McConnell, Moderation and Coherence in American Democracy, 99 CAL. L. REV.
373, 378 (2011) (“Essentially, the United States is a center-right country, with a
decided lack of extremes.”). One could argue this has become a far-right country with
a strong left opposition, but with very few moderate or even center-right
constituencies. The reinterpretation of disability law that we imagine requires a
political shift wherein the left and moderates align against the right.
102. See Mark C. Weber, IDEA Class Actions After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 45 U.
TOL. L. REV. 471, 489 (2014) (explaining a case in which the court had certified
classes of preschool children from ages three to five).
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arguments in the remainder of this Part, we will later turn to a
reinterpretation of disability law in Parts III and IV for one primary
reason — the consensus that existing disability law is meant to
remove socially constructed barriers means it should be useful for
plaintiffs like those in the Compton case.

i. Stigma
As noted above, scholars voice concerns about using current
disability law to require school reform in poor, racial minority
neighborhoods on the grounds that such use would reinforce the
stigma that minority students already suffer — that they are inferior
to White students intellectually.103 In fact, Black students and other
minority students do suffer from stereotypes and stigma based on the
unfounded historical rationalization of racial subordination.104 Black
students are three times as likely to be categorized as intellectually
disabled, and one and one-half times as likely to be labeled as
learning disabled, compared to their White peers.105
Latinx,
American Indian, and Native Alaskans are also disproportionately
represented in special education, especially in states where they
represent a substantial portion of the population.106
The intellectual rationalizations of slavery and Jim Crow, rooted in
White Supremacy and the Eugenics Movement, included the
comparison of White and Black skeletons and brains.107 This legacy is
still present in the treatment of Black and Brown students, children of
immigrants, and others among the “lower” social classes when it
comes to educational opportunity and classification.108 Segregated
special education classes are predominately filled with children from
communities that are not dominant racially, ethnically, or
linguistically in the U.S.109 This is particularly true of the special

103. See DOWD, supra, note 13, at 106; Raj, supra note 31, at 46–47.
104. Subini Ancy Annamma et al., Dis/ability Critical Race Studies (DisCrit):
Theorizing at the Intersections of Race and Dis/ability 10, in DISCRIT, supra note 6.
105. Id. at 11 (citing T. Parrish, Racial Disparities in the Identification, Funding
and Provision of Special Education, in RACIAL INEQUALITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION
(D.J. Losen & Gary Orfield eds., 2002)). For a personal description of a mother’s
struggle to assure that her Black first-grader would receive equal treatment and not
be forced into segregated spaces, see Kathleen M. Collins, A DisCrit Perspective on
the State of Florida v. George Zimmerman: Racism, Ableism and Youth Out of Place
in Community and School 183, 196–201, in DIS CRIT, supra note 6.
106. Annamma et al., supra note 104, at 11.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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education classifications of Learning Disability, Intellectual Disability
(formerly Mental Retardation), and Emotional Disturbance or
Behavior Disorders,110 perhaps the most stigmatized disabilities.
However, in the face of the argument against using existing
disability law in education cases because of potential stigma, we have
serious concerns. To argue that Black children will be stigmatized by
a claim that they suffer from one or more dis/abilities caused by their
environments is, in our view, to argue that children with dis/abilities
are inferior and that classifying racial minority children as having
dis/abilities would create a double badge of inferiority. Neither race
nor dis/ability should create stigma. Further, if structural factors like
implicitly biased social institutions are causing dis/ability, we
especially want to avoid assigning its effects to other, individual,
causes.
Shifting the lens to consider the argument from a different
perspective may illuminate our position. Assuming the law regarding
race discrimination afforded greater protections and opportunity for
school reform, would we be comfortable with the argument that
children with dis/abilities who are members of non-dominant racial
classes should not use race discrimination law to their benefit because
doing so would call attention to their race and would further
stigmatize them?
In other words, by claiming dis/ability is
stigmatizing, are we re-stigmatizing persons with dis/abilities? This is
a tricky question because the history of viewing dis/ability as inferior,
and the tendency to segregate children with dis/abilities — as well as
the history of finding that racial minority children have dis/abilities —
tends to legitimize the stigma critique. Certainly, those using the
stigma argument to resist the use of current disability law are using it
out of concern for how society has constructed dis/abilities, not out of
the belief that persons with dis/abilities are inferior.111 Still, when it

110. Id.
111. In Toward Unity in School Reform: What DisCrit Contributes to
Multicultural and Inclusive Education, Susan Baglieri, using the comparison to
Cheryl Harris’ Whiteness as Property, argues that schooling is property and that
“[t]he discourse of school reform centers on inequalities and opportunity gaps to
acquire schooling, as a form of property through meritocracy.” Susan Baglieri,

Toward Unity in School Reform: What DisCrit Contributes to Multicultural and
Inclusive Education 169, in DISCRIT, supra note 6. Instead of this neoliberal,

capitalist approach to schooling, which she believes focuses on “at risk” children and
reifies the racist and ableist constructions, Baglieri proposes that we: (1) “resist the
meritocratic practice of schooling and normative assessment structure;” (2)
“reconceptualize curriculum as being in service to communities, rather than in service
to individuals or the economy;” and (3) “support community-based control of the
economies built up around disability and disaster capitalism.” Id. at 177–79.
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comes to the stigma argument, we contend scholars should resist
accepting the idea that having a dis/ability or being a racial minority is
stigmatizing.112 We think one best avoids this potential stigma by
using a reinterpretation of disability law whenever it can assist
students with issues that are linked by both race and dis/ability.
This leaves us with the conclusion that the benefits of our
dis/ability approach outweigh the potential for stigma. We do worry
about the current shunting of Black and/or Latinx kids into special
education classes. But the problem of complex trauma leading to
educational differences in what students need is quite significant in
the violence-plagued inner-city communities we are discussing. We
hope that a group-based approach can respond to these students’
needs by changing things for everyone. Today’s disability doctrine
might not go far enough in recognizing group harms without
stigmatizing individuals, but we believe that it could do so.

ii. Doctrinal Disability Law or a Dis/ability Framework?
We also have concerns about whether the federal disability laws, as
currently interpreted, will be useful in achieving school reform. The
judge’s denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss in the Compton
case suggests a belief that CUSD should have responded to the
“child-find” rules by testing children in the school district — members
of this particular group of students may be suffering dis/ability from
complex trauma that requires accommodation in their education.
Otherwise, presumably, the judge would have dismissed the
substantive claim as not “plausible.”113 The failure to certify the class
has led to protracted settlement negotiations that may conceivably
result in improved programs for poor children attending school in
CUSD. But, given how courts generally interpret disability law

112. One question is whether one should avoid linking race and dis/ability not
because dis/ability should be stigmatized, but because, in reality, it is stigmatized.
One could argue that we should attempt to disrupt the negative meaning of dis/ability
but not link race to it because doing so may make things worse for racial minorities.
We recognize this is an important question, but the use of disability law can be
beneficial to kids like those in Compton. Hence, we decline to promote the stigma by
refusing to use existing disability law to correct problems that are linked by both race
and dis/ability.
113. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) (requiring that the court regard
the allegations in the complaint as plausible in order to survive a Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (same).
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narrowly, as demonstrated by Raj, we would not wish to rely merely
on the disability law as it is often interpreted today.114
While specific disability laws, as currently interpreted, may
ultimately prove ineffective, certain frameworks created by those
disability laws may be useful in serving as models for new legislation
or judicial interpretations that would address the intersection of
poverty and race and their effects on children. Congress or state
legislatures could rely on Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA, with significant changes in interpretation, to create statutes
that would enhance the rights of poor minority children. That said,
given the Congress’s inability to pass progressive legislation today, it
may be more effective to rely on the disability laws as written and to
argue that courts interpret them more broadly.115 Furthermore,
current state disability laws could provide further redress: either
because the laws themselves are written more progressively than the
federal laws or the state courts interpret them progressively.116
We acknowledge that the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, and IDEA emphasize the individuality of the plaintiff but we
also see potential in the principles behind those rules. The underlying
reason for a focus on individuals makes sense: historically, persons
with dis/abilities have been judged as a group as “handicapped” or
“incapacitated.” Especially when speaking of a child’s ability to
perform in school or an adult’s ability to work at a particular job, the
ability of the person to engage in major life activities would be
relevant to the accommodations needed. Historically, a group rather
than an individual determination fostered stereotypes about the
inability of individual persons to do anything that “normal” people
can do. For this reason, those writing the ADA and other disability
laws were careful to require the individual determination of whether
someone has a disability and, if so, what accommodations or
modifications to programs are necessary to allow that individual to
successfully perform a job, use the state program, or get an adequate
education.117 The individual determination also allows for finetuning

114. See supra notes 83–94 (relating Raj’s critique of Compton case).
115. See McConnell, supra note 101, at 378 (arguing that the U.S. electorate is not
progressive).
116. See, e.g., Green v. California, 165 P.3d 118, 125 (2007) (noting that the
California legislature intended its disability law in some instances to provide more
protections than federal law).
117. See Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 35 GA. L. REV. 27, 50–52 (2000) (explaining that stereotypes of what
it means to be “disabled” harms individuals with disabilities who seek to avoid
isolation).
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of the offered service and permits the environment to be as inclusive
as possible. The individual determination of “disability” may make it
very difficult to categorize people with dis/abilities into groups.
Nonetheless, we cannot forget that IDEA and other disability laws
resulted from a number of class actions, and we should offer
appropriate broad-based remedies to school-based issues of children
with disabilities.118
Moreover, Professor Mark Weber would likely disagree with Raj’s
limited characterization of the doctrinal law. Although his essay does
not address using disability law to redress racial discrimination and
trauma and was published before Compton was filed, Weber
examined the use of class action litigation to remedy violations of the
IDEA statute.119 He argues compellingly that Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes,120 a Title VII sex discrimination case that overturned the
lower court’s class certification, is not the death-knell to class action
lawsuits brought under IDEA. There is, Weber notes, a significant
difference between the negative requirements of Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act — not to discriminate illegally — and the affirmative
requirements of the IDEA.
Professor Weber highlights the
affirmative obligations imposed by IDEA on school districts:
[They] must identify, evaluate, create appropriate programs, make
placements in integrated settings with adequate related services,
review the programs, etc. These are all affirmative obligations, and
not doing any one or more of them will similarly affect all children
for whom the defendant fails to meet the obligation.121

The most prominent example of affirmative obligations in current
disability law is the “child-find” requirement of the IDEA (which is
similar to the “child-find” requirement in the Section 504 regulations,
a violation of which is alleged by the plaintiffs in Compton).122 In
essence, the “child-find” creates an affirmative duty for the school
district to seek out children within the district who have disabilities
and to assure that each child has a free and appropriate public

118. We thank Mark Weber for reminding us of this fact. Weber, supra note 102, at
472–77(explaining the history of IDEA).
119. Id.
120. 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (holding that the lower court erred in granting the 1.5
million plaintiffs’ motion to certify the class in a gender discrimination case under
Title VII).
121. Weber, supra note 101, at 494.
122. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2004) (“child-find”).
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education.123 The remedy in an IDEA class action could be to strike
down certain policies and practices that create barriers to the rights of
children with dis/abilities. In Compton, one such policy could be its
exclusive use of traditional disciplinary methods even though they are
proven to harm children suffering from complex trauma. Another is
a policy to use certain teaching techniques inappropriate for children
who suffer from complex trauma. Alternatively, the remedy under an
IDEA class action could be to affirmatively require school districts to
find children with dis/abilities and provide appropriate remedies.
At a minimum, then, under the “child-find” requirement in the
Section 504 regulations, the Compton judge’s failure to certify a class
seems inappropriate. Certainly, this is the case where there is expert
evidence that ACEs cause children to suffer emotional, mental, and
physical disabilities that affect their ability to learn and to control
themselves in a disciplinary environment. This argument is even
stronger given the evidence in Compton that scientists know how to
improve the outcomes for these children through specific teaching,
counseling, and disciplinary techniques. It is thus likely there is a class
of “disabled” students that the district must find.124
Once the screening takes place, the “child-find” requirement under
the IDEA should reveal that a large percentage of children in CUSD
suffer from disabilities related to ACEs and complex trauma leading
to dis/abilities or risk of dis/abilities that can be ameliorated. Once
CUSD has this information, it has an obligation to modify its
practices and procedures — teaching methodologies, teacher
education and training, and disciplinary systems — to assure that all
children have an appropriate education.125

123. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2012) (free, appropriate public education and related
services); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26) (related services); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)
(free, appropriate public education).
124. We are arguing that one way to find that class is to ask whether there is a
discrete and cohesive intersectional cohort of students with shared experiences of and
responses to ACEs.
125. Alternatively, plaintiffs could sue under the various disability statutes, and
upon proof that the named plaintiffs suffered complex trauma and disabilities, the
court should order screening (testing) as a remedy. See, e.g., Complaint at 128, D.R.
v. Mich. Dep’t Educ., 2016 WL 6080952 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 18, 2016) (2:16-cv-13694AJT-APP) (alleging that schools should test all children for lead contamination and
accommodate the children’s disabilities once it is determined that children have
unhealthy lead levels that affect mental functioning). The court in the Flint lead case
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies and denied the defendants’ motion for a stay pending appeal of the denial
of the motion to dismiss. See D.R. v. Michigan Dep’t Educ., 2017 WL 5010773, *1
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 2. 2017). Once the screening is complete, the school’s obligation to
modify policies and practices to accommodate its students would arise under the
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Current disability law’s focus on individuals may have been
overstated. The purpose of its individual focus is to avoid stereotypes
— protecting persons with dis/abilities, not hindering the
redressability of their injuries as a class. As Part III discusses, the
statutes assume a social construction model rather than a medical
model of biological difference.126
If the logic of the social
construction model were taken seriously, cases like Compton would
be successful, as such interpretations would emphasize tearing down
structural barriers to learning by children with dis/abilities.
Moreover, there are already precedents in disability and Title VII law
to guide the way.127 To explain further our approach to the scholarly
debate over whether disability law can be used successfully to prevent
and remedy racial inequalities, the next Part of this Article explains
social construction theory.
III. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION THEORY AND DIS/ABILITIES
In this Part, we take up the challenge of comparing race and
dis/ability by considering social construction theory. The argument
for a social constructionist view of race begins with acknowledging
that race is nothing more than a social construct. Scientists agree that
race has no biological meaning; skin color and other physical factors
that we identify with different racial groups do not connote
ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act if the testing demonstrates that a
substantial percentage of children are victims of complex trauma and its resulting
disabilities. The appropriate modifications would depend on the expert testimony
relating to what types of teacher training, curricular changes, and changes to
restorative justice techniques are most effective in that environment.
126. We admit, however, that the social construction model of existing disability
law is somewhat incomplete, and portions of the disability laws seem to contradict
one another in that some portions seem to rely on the medical model while others
seem to recognize the social model. In fact, the different models are apparent in the
definition of disability under the ADA. That statute states:
The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual–
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in paragraph
(3)).
42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1990). Sections A and B speak of a physical or mental impairment,
which seems to point toward the medical model. Section C, however, focuses on
whether others consider the individual to have an impairment, which seems clearly to
be consistent with the social model. Moreover, other sections of the statute or
regulations requiring reasonable accommodations to an individual’s disability and
modifications to policies or practices recognize that social barriers are dis/abling. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1990); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (7)(i); (8) (1991).
127. See infra note 193 (discussing cases).
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biologically significant differences.128 In fact, some modern genetic
researchers have called for the elimination of race as a category
because it is a weak proxy for the study of genetic diversity.129 As a
scientific matter, then, there is no such thing as race. Race is just the
social meaning associated with discernible patterns in physical
appearance.130
By saying that race is a social construct, we mean that society
creates racial categories and imbues them with meanings, which often
change across place and time.131 For example, a century ago, people
in the United States spoke of Jews, the Irish, and Southern Italians as
belonging to races other than White, whereas today we conceive of
these groups as White.132 In the United States an infinitesimal
amount of black “blood” was sufficient to categorize a person as
Black.133 In other societies, such as Brazil, people who have different
proportions of Black ancestry are considered to constitute different
races.134 In essence, communities create race, a category that reflects
status, acceptance (or non-acceptance), and societal privilege (or lack
of privilege). Professors of Ethnic Studies and Sociology Michael
Omi and Howard Winant thus defined racial formation theory: race’s
meanings are formed in specific cultural moments, not found in
128. Megan Gannon, Race Is a Social Construct, Scientists Argue, SCI. AM. (Feb.
6,
2016),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/essay/race-is-a-social-constructscientists-argue/ [https://perma.cc/S593-9AZR].
129. Id.; see also Michael Yudell et al., Taking Race Out of Human Genetics, 351
SCI. 564, 364–65 (2016).
130. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980S 55 (1986) (defining race).
131. See, e.g.,
IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE
LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE xiii (1996) (declaring, “race is highly contingent,
specific to times, places, and situations”). The definitive statement on the value of
socially constructing whiteness for Whites is Cheryl Harris’s Whiteness as Property,
106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993).
132. The fact that race is a social construction can be observed from the debate on
this point. While major experts have written about how these groups have “become
white” eventually in the United States, the question about whether this is true seems
to depend on the definition of “becoming white.” See, e.g., KAREN BRODKIN, HOW
JEWS BECAME WHITE FOLKS AND WHAT THAT SAYS ABOUT RACE IN AMERICA
(1998); NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995); DAVID ROEDIGER,
THE WAGES OF WHITENESS (1991). If it is a racial classification, it is false; but if it
demonstrates status in the community, these groups do “become White.” See Phillip
Q. Yang & Kavitha Koshy, The “Becoming White” Thesis Revisited, 8 J. PUB. &
PROF. PSYCH. 1, 3 (2016). In either event, both those who pose and oppose the
“becoming White” theory agree that race is socially constructed. See id. at 2.
133. OMI & WINANT, supra note 130, at 53.
134. See ANTHONY MARX, MAKING RACE AND NATION: A COMPARISON OF
SOUTH AFRICA, THE UNITED STATES, AND BRAZIL 66–68, 74 (1998) (comparing racial
formation in the United States, Brazil, and South Africa).
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nature.135 Law is an especially significant way in which the meanings
of race have been formed in the United States.136
Although race is not real biologically, it is real socially. As one of
us
has
previously
declared,
“[t]hose
stereotypes
are materially consequential in that they influence the distribution of
social goods.”137 Ignoring race is not an option because it is built into
the structures of society, and it affects the daily lives of all people.
For instance, certain racial and ethnic accents, names, and skin tones
often trigger biased behaviors in this country.138
Dis/ability, too, is a social construction. Historically, people
thought of dis/ability under the medical model.139 Dis/ability was
something in a person’s physical or mental structure. The social
model of dis/ability explains that impairments or differences, although
material, become dis/abilities because of limitations imposed by
society.140 According to Professor Samuel Bagenstos, dis/ability
rights advocates believe that a dis/ability “results from the interaction
135. OMI & WINANT, supra note 130, at 59–61.
136. See id. at 57–69 (centering law in defining racial formation).
137. See Frank Rudy Cooper, Our First Unisex President?: Black Masculinity and
Obama’s Feminine Side, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 633, 643 (2009).
138. See e.g., Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Toward a Critical Race Theory of
Evidence, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2243, 2295 (2017) (“Those same traits [speaking Spanish
or speaking English with a Latinx accent] are then associated with qualities like being
uneducated, dirty, and prone to violence.”); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario
L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being “Regarded As” Black, and Why Title
VII Should Apply Even If Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283
(2005) (considering bias against individuals with names that connote non-white
ethnicity on resumes); Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49
DUKE L.J. 1487 (2000) (highlighting ongoing colorism). Some people argue the law
should be colorblind while ignoring the crippling effects of racial categories in our
history and today. See EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS:
COLORBLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (5th ed.
2017) (“Shielded by color blindness, whites can express resentment towards
minorities; criticize their morality, values, and work ethic; and even claim to be the
victims of ‘reverse racism.’”). A denial of dis/ability, impairment, or difference
(whatever the label and cause) shares a similar omission, as it may deny the historical
paternalistic policies directed at persons with different abilities and would make
current modifications of policies and practices and removals of barriers more
difficult. While society may ultimately reach colorblind and ability-blind views and
practices, it is necessary in the meantime to correct the problems of the past (and the
present) to consider both color and impairment in shaping remedies that work to
overcome those problems.
139. SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 6, 18 (2009).
140. See DISABILITY NOTTINGHAMSHIRE, The Social Model vs. the Medical Model
of Disability, http://www.disabilitynottinghamshire.org.uk/about/social-model-vsmedical-model-of-disability/ [https://perma.cc/2G7E-E7AZ] (last visited Jan. 27,
2020).
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between some physical or mental characteristic labeled an
‘impairment’ and the contingent societal decisions that have made
physical and social structures inaccessible to people with that
condition.”141 For example, a person who uses a wheelchair who is
fully capable of working can be limited by the building in which she
works because it has no ramp.142 Likewise, someone with a history of
mental illness may be denied the break time he needs to
accommodate his difference at the workplace, and therefore end up
on the unemployment rolls. An employer might also refuse to hire
someone who has HIV out of an irrational fear they will spread AIDS
or miss work because of illness.143 This is the “disabling” of the
“disabled.”144
Dis/ability rights advocates believe that society has a responsibility
to eliminate barriers that create difficulty for persons with physical or
mental impairments.145 This position discourages society from seeing
persons with dis/abilities as pitiable, “charity cases,” and encourages
the elimination of barriers our society has created for persons with
impairments or differences.146 Some advocates argue there is no
dividing line between persons with dis/abilities and those without, but
merely a range of abilities. Professor Bagenstos explains that this
view holds that “the law should treat disability as a universal trait, one
we all possess in one way or another.”147 Conversely, other dis/ability
advocates argue that if we do not recognize impairments that,
combined with the environment, cause dis/abilities, we cannot remedy
through the law the lack of access to social goods that persons with
impairments suffer.148 Although we tend to agree that people are on

141. BAGENSTOS, supra note 139, at 6. For a nuanced argument about the
relationship between social construction and embodiment in dis/abilities theory, see
generally Tobin Siebers, Disability and the Theory of Complex Embodiment — For
Identity Politics in a New Register, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER (5th ed.
2016) (suggesting directions for a dis/abilities theory that is grounded in social
construction theory, embodiment theory, and analysis of identities).
142. Id. at 7.
143. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998) (concluding that a
woman with asymptomatic HIV had a disability under Title III of the ADA).
144. See JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF
“SEX” 232 (1993) (discussing the “girling” of the “girl”).
145. BAGENSTOS, supra note 139, at 7.
146. Id.; see also Rebecca Atkinson, Viewpoint: Is It Time to Stop Using the Term
“Disability”?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-ouch34385738 [https://perma.cc/DYV3-DGTZ] (discussing preferred terminology for
“disability”).
147. BAGENSTOS, supra note 139, at 8.
148. Id.
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a series of continuums of abilities, the nature and social impact of
which can change over time, we believe that antidiscrimination law is
necessary to break down barriers that persons with dis/abilities face.
Therefore, it is necessary to consider how physical and mental
impairments, perceived or real, combine with our environments to
create barriers that the law can remedy.
There is one goal that unifies the dis/ability community: the desire
to avoid the historic paternalistic medicalization of dis/ability and
treatment by parents, medical professionals, and bureaucrats that
deprived persons with dis/abilities of freedom and control over their
own lives.149 The dis/ability rights movement, which spurred the
passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act, is a diverse
community with “different life experiences, different material needs,
and different ideological perspectives.”150 It includes those with very
differing dis/abilities, known and unknown, who have various beliefs
about how much assimilation they would like, or even if they want to
be recognized as having a dis/ability at all.151 Yet persons with
dis/abilities agree that they should have the freedom to make their
own choices. The ADA was an attempt to enable persons in the
dis/abled community to gain freedom and control by granting access
to the workplace and public accommodations in privately-owned
businesses (such as restaurants, hotels, and professional offices), as
well as to public institutions and environments (like schools, courts,
parks, and even jails).152
Where there is a relevant intersectional cohort, existing disability
law, understood in light of the social construction model of dis/ability,
is capable of incorporating group based theories.153 The language of
the statutes, the case law, and scholarly publications have already
acknowledged this fact.154 Once one recognizes that society dis/ables

149. Id. at 4.
150. Id. at 3.
151. Id. at 3–4.
152. See Pa. Dep’t. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998) (concluding that
Title II applies to state prisons); LAURA ROTHSTEIN & ANN C. MCGINLEY,
DISABILITY LAW, CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 11–13 (6th ed. 2017).
153. To be clear, we do not think this is a case of “either/or” (individual or group).
We want to expand the ability to certify a class based on a sufficiently discrete and
cohesive intersectional cohort without removing existing disability law’s capacity to
accommodate individuals in appropriate cases.
154. Bradley Areheart, Disability Trouble, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 347 (2011)
(concluding that not only dis/ability but also impairments are socially constructed);
McGowan, supra note 117, at 53–63, 112–29 (2000) (arguing that large portions of the
ADA recognize that disability is socially constructed such as the reasonable
accommodations requirement and the fact that one who is “regarded as” having a
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people, one can understand that dis/abling social barriers often
operate upon social groups. Lack of wheelchair access affects the
group of people who do not walk steps as a whole, refusal to
accommodate mental illness affects the group of people with mental
health conditions, and having HIV is associated with a particular
social group. If society constructs dis/ability, it can surely act upon
whole social groups. What remains to be seen is how to identify the
relevant socially dis/abled group in a class action and how this affects
the critique of the Compton case’s denial of class certification.
IV. WHY THE COMPTON STUDENTS SHOULD GET CLASS STATUS AS
“PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES”
The Compton case is a good example of how dis/ability is socially
constructed, including when it intersects with social positions such as
race and social locations such as the inner-city.155 Our intersectional
cohort theory, which we expound in this Part, demonstrates that
individuals with similar identities, environments, and experiences
often suffer similar results. Consistent with current disability law, the
Compton court could have recognized these facts instead of initially
denying the class certification and refusing the temporary injunction’s
broad remedy.
A. Intersectionality Theory and Cohorts
We find it helpful to focus on young Black male students in innercity neighborhoods as an example of intersectional cohort theory. We
are aware that this is a fraught enterprise. Social construction theory
says there is no fixed meaning of characteristics like youth, race, and
gender except as they are socially defined in specific social
contexts.156 Anti-essentialism theory, which also emerges from
poststructuralism, says we should not assume there is an essence to
identities such as being young, black, or male.157 As criminologists

disability actually is defined as having a disability); cf. Adam M. Samaha, What Good
Is the Social Model of Disability? 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1251–54 (2000)
(recognizing the social construction theory of dis/ability but arguing that it is not
useful).
155. See supra note 3 (defining and distinguishing social position and social
location).
156. See supra Part III (discussing social construction theory).
157. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (defining gender essentialism as “the notion that a
unitary, ‘essential’ women’s experience can be isolated and described independently
of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience”).
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Kathryn Henne and Emily Troshynski recently put it, “attempts to
distinguish ‘Blackness’ or ‘womanhood’ . . . inevitably construct
identities in essentialist ways.”158 Prime examples of the need for
anti-essentialism are the ways White women’s experiences have stood
in for all women and Black men’s experiences have represented all
Blacks in the feminist and antiracist movements.159 Intersectionality
theory takes this insight in another direction by trying to figure out
the ways in which identities are more complex than their essentialized
versions.160
In this Section, we explore the implication of
intersectionality theory when it is applied to intersectionally-defined,
discrete, and cohesive groups.161

158. Kathryn Henne & Emily I. Troshynski, Intersectional Criminologies for the
Contemporary Moment: Crucial Questions of Power, Praxis, and Criminological
Control, 27 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 55, 58 (2019).
159. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140; see also Carbado & Harris, supra

note 27, at 2201 (2019) (summarizing Crenshaw’s views on anti-essentialism).
160. Carbado & Harris say:
Intersectionality is not an argument against essentialism per se. Nor is
intersectionality com- mitted to anti-essentialism per se. Our view is that
judging a particular analysis to be essentialist does not settle normative
questions; rather, the important consideration is whether the deployment of
essentialism is justified empirically and normatively in a particular context.
See Carbado & Harris, supra note 27, at 2204. We agree if we define “essentialism”
to be a neutral term describing how persons of certain characteristics can represent a
group with similar characteristics and experiences (Black women, Black children
living in inner city neighborhoods, etc.). But of course, we understand Carbado and
Harris as not approving of the type of essentialism (all women’s experiences can be
represented by White women’s experiences) that Crenshaw spoke against. See id.
(distinguishing anti-essentialism and intersectionality theory). While intersectionality
theory might not be per se anti-essentialist, we think a sensible application of
intersectionality theory presumes that some essentialist moves are illegitimate but
others, like that embodied by intersectional cohort theory, are legitimate.
161. Collins identifies a number of assumptions that are prevalent in
intersectionality scholarship. She says that one or more of these assumptions is
always present, though some may be absent, and the configuration varies. Collins,
supra note 29, at 14. Here is a summary of her list:
 “Race, class, gender, sexuality, age, ability, nation, ethnicity, and similar
categories . . . are best understood in relational terms . . . ”;
 Categories of identity create power relations — racism, sexism, classism,
and related prejudices — that are interrelated;
 The power relations influence social formations that are organized
around unequal distribution of material relations and social experiences;
 Social formations are “historically contingent and cross-culturally
specific,” varying across times and places;
 Individuals differentially positioned “within intersecting systems of
power” develop “different points of view on their own and others’
experiences . . . ”;
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Intersectionality theory is a set162 of insights stemming from the
critique of the “single-axis framework” for thinking about
identities.163 The single-axis framework generalizes the experiences
of racial or gender subordination, for example, by assuming that if an
employer does not discriminate against all Blacks or all Whites, it
cannot be discriminating against Black women. That assumption is
false, as (mostly White male) employers may feel solidarity with their
Black male peers and White female peers, but hold negative
stereotypes about Black women.164 Sociologist Kathy Davis adds that
intersectionality theorists should investigate the “interaction[s]
between gender, race, and other categories of difference in individual
lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural
ideologies and the outcomes of these interactions in terms of
power.”165
Broadly speaking, we are interested in the relationship between
individual identity formation and social structures.166 By identity
formation, we mean the processes of development of an internal
sense of self-identity and performance of one’s identity in order to
negotiate against others’ attributions of identity to the individual.

 Social formations of inequality “are fundamentally unjust,” thus sparking
“engagements that uphold or contest the status quo.”
Id. Collins also identifies six themes in the topics of intersectional analyses. See id. at
11–13 (thematizing current work).
162. We agree with legal anthropologist Khiara Bridges’s persuasive argument that
there is not, and should not be, one true intersectionality methodology. See BRIDGES,
supra note 29, at 247 (“Indeed, crafting the theory in a way that limits its capacity
may be ill-advised.”); accord Devon Carbado, Colorblind Intersectionality, 38 SIGNS:
J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 811, 841 (2013) (suggesting scholars “push the
theoretical boundaries of intersectionality rather than disciplining and policing
them”).
163. Crenshaw, supra note 159, at 140.
164. See id. at 141–50 (describing cases failing to recognize uniqueness of
discrimination against Black women).
165. Davis, supra note 29, at 68.
166. See id. at 14 (declaring that people develop “different points of view on their
own . . . experiences,” highly influenced by “their subject position within intersecting
systems of power”). Note, as well, that intersectionality theory is born out of a
modified poststructuralist model of identity as socially constructed. See Patricia Hill
Collins, “What’s Going On?”: Black Feminist Thought and the Politics of
Postmodernism, in WORKING IN THE RUINS: FEMINIST POSTSTRUCTURALIST THEORY
AND METHODS IN EDUCATION 28, 35 (Elizabeth A. St. Pierre & Wanda S. Pillow eds.,
2000) (arguing poststructuralist interrogation of linguistic oppositions is valuable to
intersectionality theory). However, Crenshaw soundly dismissed “vulgar
constructionism,” which suggests that race has no appropriate role in understanding
peoples’ experiences or behaviors. See Crenshaw, supra note 28, at 1296–98
(challenging courts’ use of constructionism to thwart political progress by racial
minorities).
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Defining this three-part summary of the processes of identity
formation will help show how the concept of intersectional cohorts
bridges the gap between micro- and macro-levels of analysis.
When considering the Compton case, the relationship between
identity formation and social structure plays out as follows. First, the
intersection of categories of identity affects people’s senses of self.
That is significant here because being at a particular intersection of
race, gender, class, age, and geography affects the Compton plaintiffs’
subjective experiences of their complex trauma and their schooling.
Second, the intersection of categories of identity creates unique
attributed identities, or stereotypes about the meanings of a person’s
identities.167 We should thus expect the Compton plaintiffs to be
treated similarly by society — through group-based discrimination —
in terms of the racial, gender, class, and geographic discrimination
that contributes to their complex trauma. Third, people “negotiate”
between their self-identities and attributed identities by “performing”
their identities in ways meant to get society to treat them the way they
want to be treated. However, society is complex; social systems
themselves, such as the family, housing, and criminal justice, can
intersect in ways that exacerbate subordination.168
Here, the
Compton school system’s failure to address the students’ complex
trauma exacerbates the complex trauma that the housing system

167. See Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality,
Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 883

n.162 (2006) (“Identity performance theory relies on distinctions between the
components of self-identity and attributed identity on the one hand and the process
of identity negotiation on the other.”); see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati,
Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1264–65, 1268 (analyzing relationship
between sense of self, stereotypes, and identity performance); cf. Collins, supra note
29, at 14 (“Individuals and groups differentially placed within intersecting systems of
power have different points of view on . . . others’ experiences” that are highly
influenced by “their social locations within power relations.”).
168. This is “systems intersectionality.” See Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, From Private

Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking Intersectionally About Women, Race, and
Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418, 1427 (2012) (“These intersections are

constituted by a variety of social forces that situate women of color within contexts
structured by various social hierarchies and that render them disproportionally
available to certain punitive policies and discretionary judgments that dynamically
reproduce these hierarchies.”); Dorothy Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the
Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1491 (2012) (“The
analysis of the roles black mothers play in both the prison and foster care systems
reveals that these systems intersect with each other to jointly perpetuate unjust
hierarchies of race, class, and gender.”); Priscilla A. Ocen, The New Racially

Restrictive Covenant: Race, Welfare, and the Policing of Black Women in Subsidized
Housing, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1540, 1544 (2012) (illustrating how policing and housing

systems are entwined).
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(segregation), legal system (overpolicing of poor, young, racial
minorities in urban areas), and other social systems create for
Compton students.169 The similarities in these students’ senses of self,
attributed identities, and environmental influences make them a
discrete and cohesive intersectional cohort based on the common
societal treatment they receive.170
The above understanding of the relationship between identity
formation and social structure allows us to define an intersectional
cohort as a cluster of people who share similar experiences, selfidentities, attributed identities, and identity performances to the
extent that it is appropriate to think of them as a discrete and
cohesive group in relation to a particular issue. In Crenshaw’s
analysis of employment discrimination cases, Black women were an
appropriate intersectional cohort to consider because they were
similarly discriminated against by means of the same type of
reasoning. Whether caused by explicit or implicit factors, the
employers (who are generally White men) favored both Black men
and White women over Black women. This is because the employers
share maleness with Black men and whiteness with White women.171
From the courts’ points of view, there could not be discrimination
against individual Black women based on race or sex because the
employers had hired or retained Black men and White women.172
Understanding Black women as a relevant intersectional cohort
explained the discrimination at hand. Only then could we see that
Black women’s intersecting race-gender identities made them
vulnerable to a specific form of discrimination that was still a group
based claim.
Considering who constitutes the relevant intersectional cohort in a
situation assists with one of intersectionality theory’s most vexing
questions: how specific to be about individuals’ identities. We could
specify every characteristic of every individual in every context — as
in noting that Chiron is a skinny, dark-skinned, Black, gay male high
school student living in inner-city Miami who is poor and has a drugaddicted mother — or we could just specify some of the larger factors
at play that he shares with a discrete and cohesive group: racism,
being an inner-city resident, and classism. Our argument that we can

169. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing systems
intersectionality).
170. See supra note 8 (defining “discrete” and “cohesive vis a vis intersectional
cohorts).
171. See Crenshaw, supra note 159, at 148 (making this argument).
172. See id.
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identify relevant intersectional cohorts builds upon Collins’s insight
that there is a meso-level in between the micro-level of individuals
and the macro-level of society-wide structures, in which discrete,
cohesive social groups share similar qualities and experiences.173
The micro-level is that of the intersectionally-defined individual.174
The processes of identity formation are appropriate concerns of
analysis at the micro level. The problem with analyzing only at that
level is that it “can make addressing more large-scale questions using
generalized criteria impossible.”175 Sometimes we need to identify a
pattern of discrimination based on race, gender, class, and so on, and
that can be hard to do if one must specify every micro-level difference
among individuals.
Next, the macro-level is the level of the social structure writ large.
Whereas individual decisions about the meaning of someone’s
gender, race, class, and so on occur at the micro-level of identity
formation, societal power relations around identities of gender, race,
class, and so on occur at the macro-level of society.176 White
supremacist norms (broadly speaking, racism), hegemonic
masculinities (broadly speaking, patriarchy), and discourses about
“makers” and “takers” (broadly speaking, classism), are examples of
macro-level phenomena.177
Accordingly, “the analysis of the
structural positioning of large groups is, above all, grounded in the
macro level.”178 The concern at this level is “to be able to detect
relevancies and correlations.”179 To understand a problem like the
complex trauma caused to poor Black and/or Latinx students in inner
cities, then, we need to be able to detect patterns in ACEs and their
causation of trauma.
Finally, the meso-level is the in-between level of identities, such as
that of organizations, institutions, and communities.180 Meso-level
organizations and institutions include families, churches, and political

173. See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, FIGHTING WORDS: BLACK WOMEN AND THE
SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 226–27 (1998) (distinguishing levels of sociological analysis).
Collins acknowledges that “all of these levels work together recursively.” Id. at 227
(distinguishing levels of sociological analysis).
174. See Winker & Degele, supra note 32, at 52–53 (identifying levels of analysis).
175. Id. at 53.
176. See id. at 55 (describing “sociostructural level”).
177. See id. (connecting gender, class, and race to heteronormativism, classism, and
racism)
178. Id. at 53.
179. Id. at 57.
180. See id. at 52–53 (distinguishing levels of society and discussing Patricia Hill
Collins’s “matrix of domination”).
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groups,181 while meso-level communities include discrete and
cohesive social groups.182 Collins’s example of meso level identity is
Black women in the Jim Crow South. These women were “outsiderswithin,” who had to work in domestic service jobs that threatened
their dignity and sexual autonomy.183 That is, they were clearly
demarcated as socially marginalized but were forced to work in close
quarters with Whites. This subjected them to verbal abuse and sexual
assault, so they developed networks to pass on information about how
to deal with their status.184 At bus stops, in churches, and in homes,
they defined ways to be working Black women, creating a discrete
and cohesive social group at the meso-level.185 Their example of
shared qualities, experiences, and responses seems to apply to all
intersectionally-defined cohorts with sufficient discreteness and
cohesiveness.
Our middle-ground method avoids the problems of reducing the
analysis to the characteristics of each individual and of overgeneralizing by essentializing characteristics such as race or gender.
As German sociologists Gabriele Winker and Nina Degele put it:
[I]t is advisable to divide the areas of subject matter . . . into groups
or types. The types . . . resemble each other more than others in
terms of particular features . . . [and] must exhibit the highest
possible internal homogeneity and, on the other hand, be
characterized by a sufficient level of external heterogeneity when
compared to each other.186

In fact, scholars already identify intersectional cohorts when they
describe their subjects on more than just the basis of a single-axis of
identity, but not in such a specific way that it approaches the
vanishing point of purely individual analysis.
We thus propose a new focus for intersectional theory:
consideration of the impact of relevant discrete and cohesive mesolevel groups, intersectional cohorts, on social and legal analysis. We
assert that intersectionality has always been a cohort theory. It has
always wondered whether social groups were being described
sufficiently specifically under,
for instance, employment
discrimination law, without making the claim that everybody should

181. See COLLINS, supra note 173, at 6–7 (identifying spaces where Black women
forged collective ideas).
182. See supra note 8.
183. See id. at 5 (defining term).
184. See id. at 6–7.
185. See id. at 226–27 (distinguishing levels of society).
186. Winker & Degele, supra note 32, at 60 (internal quotation omitted).

2020]

INTERSECTIONAL COHORTS, DIS/ABILITY, AND CLASS ACTIONS

333

have a suit based on their particular set of identity characteristics. We
call for evaluating whether a potential intersectional cohort includes
people sharing similar experiences, self-identities, attributed
identities, and identity performances making them a discrete and a
cohesive group with respect to a particular context and on a specific
issue. Although Professor Crenshaw and those following her
implicitly recognized that intersectionality theory required the
application of some essentialism (i.e. the effect of discrimination on
Black women), what is new here is the open admission that some
form of justifiable essentialism is necessary and a method for
determining what is the relevant level of specificity needed to make
the claim justifiable.
With this approach in mind, poor Black and Latinx students of all
genders in high-crime inner-city neighborhoods strike us as relevant
intersectional cohorts. In fact, the social science data demonstrates
that this group forms a cohort that suffers disproportionately from
disabilities caused by complex trauma. Students like those in
Compton are a discrete group because their shared characteristics and
unique experiences make them a coherent set of individuals that is
different from many other social groups. The students are cohesive
and sufficiently homogenous in that they share identity characteristics
and similar experiences along a number of axes. There are many
shared ways of being an inner-city racial minority student, including
dress, musical taste, and responses to interpersonal conflict (such as
various forms of “cool poses”).187 The Compton students are also
united as a group or cohort because they are subject to racism,
classism, violence, and so on, in ways that are not true of inner-city
White students or suburban Black students.188
Understanding the Compton plaintiffs as an intersectional cohort
helps reveal that they have a group-based theory of the case: this
particular environment causes complex trauma and emotional,
mental, and physical disabilities to particular types of people as a
group. The meso-level intersectional cohort is defined by being (1)
Black and/or Latinx, (2) schoolchildren, (3) who live in violence-torn
communities, (4) in the inner-city. If members of the cohort are
suffering complex trauma, they are being subjected to it because they
are members of this specific group. That is so because of the

187. See VICTOR RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO
BOYS xiv (2011) (discussing identities of young inner-city Black and Latinx males).
188. Cf. Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion
at the Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1104–05 (2008) (showing race mattered
even when class held constant when White communities wanted to expand).
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structural racism that leads to poverty-stricken inner-city violencetorn neighborhoods like those in Compton and because of the
interpersonal racism that members of these communities often
experience as group-based harms.
B. Why the Concept of Intersectional Cohorts Requires a Remedy in

Compton

The form that complex trauma takes in students — like those in the
Compton suit — is specific to subgroups based on their particular
experiences as members of cohorts defined by shared combinations of
race, gender, class, dis/ability, sexual orientation, religion, age,
geography, and other significant identities. In reality, if not in law, it
is the intersection of racism, poverty, and an inner-city environment
that does most of the work in creating complex (and racialized)
trauma for Compton’s students.
This intersectional cohort is
particularly subject to ACEs and complex trauma that impacts the
type of schooling they need.
We acknowledge that existing disability statutes are built on the
assumption that every individual will prove their disability, but we
contend that such an understanding of the disability statutes is
incomplete.189 Accepting the constructivist model of dis/ability, as the
majority of scholars and many legislators do,190 requires thinking
about dis/ability as resulting from socially-constructed barriers.191
In this view, societal norms can disable individuals. The statutory
regime of disability law should see eliminating those barriers as its
prime directive.192 Such an interpretation would allow a class action
under disability law in situations where societal and environmental
factors are dis/abling a relevant intersectional cohort. The members
of the relevant intersectional cohort — the group against which

189. See supra Part II.B.ii (discussing statutory regime).
190. See, e.g., Deborah Kaplan, The Definition of Disability (2000),
http://contracabal.info/cc-com/PDF/The%20Definition%20of%20Disability.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9W2D-EX9P] (noting that important parts of the ADA, for
example, are based on the notion of social construct, among them, defining disability
as including persons who are perceived to be impaired or disabled, and the
reasonable accommodation requirement); Areheart, supra note 154, at 348–49
(noting that many scholars see disability as a social construct and arguing that
impairment itself may be socially constructed); McGowan, supra note 117, at 53–63,
112–20 (arguing that a good portion of the ADA includes provisions that recognize
that disability is a social construct).
191. See supra Part III (analyzing social construction thesis).
192. See supra notes 139–47 (identifying statutory goal of removing barriers).
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society throws up barriers — would be (rebuttably) presumed to be
legitimate members of the class.
Under our approach, defendants may argue in the remedial phase
of the case that particular individuals have not suffered from the
barriers to learning existing in the defendants’ school district, but they
could not say there should be no class certification solely on the
theory that every individual will respond differently to the barriers.193
Such an argument would be a truism: individuals necessarily could
respond differently. But once we recognize that an intersectional
cohort has similar experiences and some shared responses, it makes
sense to presume that members of the cohort are similarly affected
until such time as the defendant can prove otherwise as to specific
individuals.
Children like Chiron often fall behind in school because of
societally created barriers, and when these children suffer from
disabilities as a result of these barriers, disability law needs to
recognize that the only way to remedy this harm is to create class
remedies. Here, the very detailed allegations in the Compton case as
well as the evidence presented at the hearing on the plaintiffs’
motions for class certification and injunctive relief make it clear that a
significant percentage of children in the school district suffer ACEs
and complex trauma, and that complex trauma had lead to difficulties
in a large percentage of children’s learning and responding to school
discipline.194 At the pre-trial stages, a court should be able to certify a

193. This is consistent with the holding in United States v. Denver, 943 F. Supp.
1304 (D. Colo. 1996), an ADA pattern and practice case where the court held that it
is not necessary to demonstrate that each member of the class has been victimized by
the defendant’s policy in the liability stage of a disability pattern or practice case.
Denver is consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence in Title VII. In a pattern or
practices race discrimination case under Title VII, the plaintiffs may show a pattern
or practice by demonstrating a statistical imbalance combined with anecdotal
evidence of race discrimination in the workplace. Once that showing is met, the
employer is known to engage in a pattern or practice of race discrimination. At that
point, the defendant has lost but has the right to prove that individual members of the
class would not have been hired or promoted absent race discrimination. Thus, it is
only in this remedial stage of the litigation when the individual’s suffering from race
discrimination arises, and at this point, because the plaintiff has already proved that
the employer engages in race discrimination as a practice, it is the employer’s burden
to prove that individual members of the class did not suffer based on race
discrimination. See Int’l. Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336–42,
360–62 (1977). This is the model that should be used for the cohort cases.
194. First Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶ 73–122; P.P. v. Compton
Unified Sch. Dist., 2015 WL 5752770, at *6 (Sept. 29, 2015) (noting that the expert
affidavits aver that nearly 25% of students in the district have suffered multiple ACEs
and/or complex trauma).
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class if sufficient allegations and preliminary evidence of damage to a
significant portion of the relevant intersectional cohort exist,
combined with affidavits demonstrating that a significant portion of
the children in the district suffer ACEs and complex trauma.195
Since the ADA already contemplates both pattern and practice
disparate impact lawsuits196 brought by groups, there is no reason not
to recognize the Compton class.197 At its core, disability law requires
schools to modify policies and practices that create barriers to

195. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) requires that all class actions have: (a) a sufficiently
numerous group (“numerosity”); (b) common questions of law and fact affecting the
group (“commonality”); (c) with the named plaintiff(s)’ bringing claims typical of the
class (“typicality”); and (d) the named plaintiff(s)’ being an “adequate”
representative of the class (“adequacy”). FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). Beyond this basic
requirement, Rule 23(b) sets forth three types of class actions. A Rule 23(b)(3)
damages class action is problematic for this type of case because it requires that
common questions of law or fact predominate over individual questions and that a
class action be superior to individual adjudication of damage claims. This seems like
such a situation, where the individuals in the class experience, as a group, important
contributors to their complex trauma, including racism and the effects of urbaphobia
(such as over-policing). However, both a Rule 23(b)(1) “prejudice” class action (a
shorthand name because this type of action seeks to avoid prejudicing the defendant
due to inconsistent decisions involving class members) or a Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive
class action, particularly the latter, appear apt vehicles for adjudicating this type of
claim. Rule 23(b)(2), for example, permits class actions where “the party opposing
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that generally apply to the class, so
that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate
respecting the class as a whole.” See BROOKE D. COLEMAN ET AL., LEARNING CIVIL
PROCEDURE 410–20 (3d ed. 2018). Plaintiffs’ theory of the case is that the School
District has failed to take reasonable measures to reduce the dis/abling effects of
ACEs trauma for the class members and that this requires court intervention via
injunction to require defendants to improve the school environment. Although there
is ample division among courts regarding class actions, this use of the class action —
to require the defendants to act to provide a safer environment — seems appropriate.
Courts have used class action injunctive power to administer prisons, medical
institutions, schools (including complex and controversial desegregation and busing
plans), police departments, and other organizations or workforces. There is no reason
to think courts less capable of improving the trauma-producing environment of
Compton. See generally Abraham Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). In addition, partial class action may
proceed regarding liability only or the court may order the class divided into subclasses for more efficient administration or to focus on particular facilities and
policies affecting particular members of the class.
196. See Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate
Impact, and Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 879–901 (2006) (noting the decline of
disparate impact class actions in disability employment discrimination cases and
arguing for a theory of pan-disability in which even though individuals with certain
dis/abilities might see themselves as heterogeneous, a class action should lie when
others define them as within the same category).
197. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (allowing disparate impact
suits); see supra note 19 (discussing class actions in disability law cases).
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children with disabilities who attend or wish to attend their school
unless the school can prove that such modifications would cause a
fundamental alteration of their school programs.198 In the Compton
case, barriers such as teaching and disciplinary procedures could be
modified to grant children meaningful access to education. At least in
the liability phase of a lawsuit, where the plaintiffs request class
certification and support it with credible expert evidence, the courts
should adopt a rebuttable presumption that children belonging to
particular intersectional cohorts based on race, experience, and
environment have suffered complex trauma and a disability that falls
under the statute. This is especially appropriate once the plaintiffs
have alleged and offered evidence that the science supports a finding
of widespread dis/ability among children facing the circumstances at
hand. Later in the remedial phase of the litigation, the defendants
may attempt to rebut the presumption as to individual students.199
The constructivist model contradicts the preference for an
individual injury in the current interpretations of the federal
statutes. Social construction is already understood to affect cohorts,
not individuals. Even when we consider intersectionality, which is a
must even when we are generalizing, sub-groups such as poor, young
transgender Chicano women constitute a discrete and cohesive group
with many shared experiences. As a matter of discrimination based
on attributed identities, discriminatory social norms at the
intersection of class, age, queerness, ethnicity, and gender treat the
sub-group the same and affect the entire cohort. Likewise, if a
positive or negative social environment affects ability, it will affect
cohorts as well as individuals. This group effect is especially likely
when the social environment includes group-based discrimination on
bases such as race, class, and geography. Hence, when the complaint
alleges the types of conditions existing in Compton, harm suffered by
various plaintiffs, and science supporting the causal link between the
environment and harm, requiring proof that every member of the
purported class suffers a disability contradicts the underlying reality
of how these disabilities arise. The fact that the statute permits class
actions and both pattern or practice and disparate impact lawsuits
demonstrates the legitimacy of recognizing that disabilities can and do
affect intersectional cohorts. Additionally, the statutory contradiction
should be resolved in favor of allowing individual plaintiffs to prove
disability by showing their social cohort is dis/abled.

198. See supra notes 19, 118–25 and accompanying text (explaining the law).
199. See supra notes 19, 193 (explaining this requirement).
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Showing that an intersectional cohort is dis/abled by social barriers
should establish individual disability under the law when two
important factors are present. First, there should be empirical proof,
likely in the form of statistics, that a cohort is being disabled by social
norms in a particular environment. In the Compton case, to be a
Black and/or Latinx kid of any gender living in a poor, high-crime
neighborhood does seem connected to the complex trauma that
environment often spawns. The very detailed Compton First
Amended Complaint and the expert affidavits supporting the
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and class certification
would satisfy that requirement. Second, that cohort should be
narrowly enough defined in terms of being discrete and cohesive that
we are confident that membership in the cohort makes it likely the
individual also suffers the disability. The Compton intersectional
cohort is sufficiently discrete because it is not fungible with arguably
similarly challenged groups, such as poor White rural students.
Moreover, it is sufficiently cohesive because it shares identity
characteristics, attributed identities, and common responses to
societal treatment. Since intersectional cohorts are dis/abled by
societal barriers — for example, socially created trauma from racism
and poverty that creates the very impairments that affect the major
life activities of reading, remembering, and learning — this Article’s
proposal to treat intersectional cohorts as a class comports with the
underlying reality of the social construction of dis/ability.
Calling for recognizing cohorts in disability law will generate
criticism, but we think it is necessary to effectuate the law’s overall
goal of removing social barriers. Certainly, there is a tension between
the idea of recognizing that social barriers dis/able people as a cohort
and recognizing the dignity interests in treating people as individuals.
But the overall purpose of the federal disability statutes is to address
barriers established by social policies. Those barriers could be
physical, as in the lack of a ramp; temporal, as in the use of fixed-time
tests; policy-based, as in the use of curricular measures that do not
further the learning process; or even attitudinal, as in a decision to
segregate certain children with dis/abilities from others in school
classes and programs because of fear or distaste.
Where structures of inner-city poverty and violence combine with
racial discrimination, disability law ought to remedy those barriers,
when they culminate in dis/abilities, as well. We thus argue the
federal disability statutes must be interpreted to recognize that
complex trauma affects cohorts as well as individuals. Accordingly,
the Compton students’ and other similar class actions should be
certified because the putative class’s status — poor, Black and Latinx
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inner-city youth in schools where the students suffer a large
percentage of ACEs and the resultant complex trauma — establishes
a high likelihood they suffer similar disabilities from the complex
trauma that is alleged in the complaint.
Some might object that disability law requires individual analysis,
but the Compton court’s denial of the motion to dismiss the
substantive claim of group-based harm already implies the
appropriateness of certifying a class based on that group status. In
situations where the dis/ability is broadly shared and arises from
group harm, however, the individualistic approach fails to adequately
address the harms, their structural causes, and the proper remedies.
It is true that the individual approach can be important to protect the
rights of children with individual dis/abilities in schools. While we
emphasize the implications of the social construction approach, we
recognize that allowing individuals to avoid social barriers based on
stereotypes about groups was and continues to be important.
Sometimes, distinguishing individuals from their intersectional
cohorts will allow the fashioning of a better remedy. However, at
least where the remedy would be group-based, and would not harm
non-group members, there is no reason to make every putative class
member prove the disability individually. That is, to certify a class
under these circumstances, one should only need to show that a
substantial portion of the group has a common experience and a
common response. Here, the remedies sought are school-wide
changes in the delivery of curriculum and discipline, as well as testing
to identify further dis/ability-based needs for individual students.
Our contribution to dis/ability studies and critical race theory
scholarship is to point out that individuals’ experiences of trauma and
dis/ability are intertwined with their meso-level group-based identities
and that the courts should remedy this problem.
When an
intersectional cohort establishes that it suffers group-targeted harms
that lead to dis/abilities, that should be deemed to establish the
likelihood that individuals from the particular intersectional cohort
suffer that dis/ability.
To say the individual is part of the
intersectional cohort suffering group-based harm is to say that the
individual is a member of a class that should be certified.
If the Compton court had seriously considered the way the
plaintiffs’ shared experiences of trauma make them an intersectional
cohort, it might have understood that the individuals in the cohort
already were likely to experience complex trauma and resulting
disabilities. We thus draw a conclusion about the Compton case —
that establishing the likelihood that a social group will suffer a
“disability” from a particular intersection of identities and
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experiences should establish the likelihood that members of that
intersectional cohort are disabled, so long as the science supports the
conclusion. We also draw a conclusion about intersectionality theory:
that understanding intersectional cohorts helps us better analyze the
shared nature of the trauma experienced by poor Black and/or Latinx
inner-city students.
CONCLUSION
In Moonlight, Chiron achieves a kind of redemption, but at a heavy
cost and with no thanks to his schooling.200 While preventing
complex trauma and its concomitant injuries should definitely be the
goal of innovative approaches like the New Deal for Children of
Color recommended by Professor Dowd’s book, we argue that the
complete social transformation recommended by Dowd is unlikely to
occur in the near future.201 We go against the scholarly grain and see
concrete ways that current disability law could be interpreted to aid
the intersectional cohort of poor Black and Latinx students in
violence-torn inner-city communities. Consequently, we offer a
strong social constructionist theory of dis/ability and the concept of
intersectional cohorts as a means to modify procedures and practices
in schools where these cohorts exist. Existing disability law should
allow class actions in cases like Compton and permit courts to enter
mandatory injunctions requiring schools to modify their procedures
to help ameliorate the harm suffered by students. This Article shows
why what ought to be is not as untenable as the Compton court
suggests.
Yet this Article’s larger contribution is to intervene in the
literature of intersectionality theory by creating the concept of
intersectional cohorts. Whereas intersectionality theory has been
about exploring the uniqueness of experiences of particular
overlapping identities in distinct social contexts, our theory helps
identify the relevant level of specificity for that analysis. Scholars
should look at the processes of identity formation and the cultural
context and identify relevant intersectional cohorts.
Whether
considering dis/abilities, race, gender, class, and so on, evaluating who
might be part of a discrete and cohesive intersectional cohort in a
given social location can help us make new forms of argument. As

200. Spoiler alert: the story does end with the potential for progress as Chiron is
able to express his emotions to a former high school classmate.
201. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (arguing that Dowd’s plan is
unlikely).
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Nancy Dowd’s call for a new deal for children of color reminds us,
kids like Chiron need and deserve this extension of intersectional
analysis.

